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ABSTRACT
Smartphones have become an essential part of our lives, and are used daily for
important tasks like banking, shopping, and making phone calls. Smartphones provide
several interaction channels which can be affected by a compromised mobile OS. This
dissertation focuses on the user interaction channels of UI input and audio I/O. The
security of the software running on smartphones has become more critical because of
widespread smartphone usage. A technology called TEE (Trusted Execution
Environment) has been introduced to help protect users in the event of OS compromise,
with the most commonly deployed TEE on mobile devices being ARM TrustZone.
This dissertation utilizes ARM TrustZone to provide secure design for user interaction
channels of UI input (called Truz-UI) and Audio I/O for VoIP calls (called Truz-Call). The
primary goal is to ensure that the design is transparent to mobile applications. During
research based on TEE, one of the important challenges that is encountered is the ability
to prototype a secure design. In TEE research one often needs to interface hardware
peripherals with the TEE OS, which can be challenging for non-hardware experts,
depending on the available support from the TEE OS vendor. This dissertation discusses a
simulation based approach (called Truz-Sim) that reduces setup time and hardware
experience required to build a hardware environment for TEE prototyping.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones have become a common tool in modern society. Based on recent
statistics [78] from the US, as of Feb 2019 81% of adults own a smartphone. One of the
popular mobile OS Android now has a majority market share [89]. The widespread
adoption of smartphones makes the security of mobile OS extremely important.
Unfortunately, the recent trend has not been promising. CVE numbers show that the
number of disclosed vulnerabilities in Android has remained high [71]. A recent attack on
Android could achieve arbitrary code execution in a privileged process by using a crafted
image file [63]. Smartphones provide several interaction channels which can be affected
by a compromised mobile OS. This chapter discusses the types of smartphone interaction
channels and provides an overview of secure solutions for specific interaction channels.

1.1

Risks faced by Smartphone Channels

Smartphones provide several interaction channels (Figure 1.1), including user
interaction channels (UI and audio I/O), context based channels (camera and GPS),
inter-phone channels (bluetooth and NFC), and back end channels (network interface to
communicate with server). A compromised mobile OS can affect various use cases for
these channels. For user interaction channels like UI input and audio I/O, a compromised
OS can steal user secrets (e.g. password). For context based channels like camera and

2

Fig. 1.1.: Smartphone Interaction Channels

location, a compromised OS can falsify environment (e.g. spoof location). For inter-phone
channels like NFC and bluetooth, a compromised OS can steal data being exchanged
between the devices. For back-end channels with servers, a compromised OS can steal
data sent to a server or send forged data to a server.
This dissertation focuses on the user interaction channels of UI input and audio I/O. UI
input is used to allow the user to enter a secret or to approve an action in a mobile
application. For example, in case of a banking application, a compromised OS can steal
user’s secret information such as bank passwords, and spoof actions such as transferring
money out of the user’s bank accounts on behalf of the user. An important use case of
audio I/O is user’s ability to make phone calls. In recent years, VoIP apps such as
Signal [25] and Whatsapp [14] have become popular ways for making a call. Recent
survey [64] indicates top social apps used have VoIP calling support. A compromised
mobile OS can listen to user’s VoIP call. Today different types of users need to have a
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secure means of calling, including activists, journalists, government employees etc. Given
the risk to user interaction channels, there is a need to design solutions utilizing features in
mobile architectures that can provide security inspite of a compromised mobile OS.

1.2

ARM Architecture and Trusted Execution Environment

Majority of mobile devices use ARM architecture [26]. It is divided into two
worlds [65] as shown in Figure 1.2. The normal world contains normal apps and mobile
OS (like Android). As mentioned in previous sections, the mobile OS can be potentially
compromised. To design secure solutions, one may look at utilizing the hypervisor which
has higher privilege than the mobile OS. Existing research [155] shows vulnerabilities in
hypervisor on the ARM platform. Given the normal world cannot be trusted to design
secure solutions, ARM architecture contains a second world called the secure world.

Fig. 1.2.: ARM Architecture Privilege Levels
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The secure world, also referred to as trusted execution environment (TEE), provides an
execution environment isolated from the normal world. The most commonly deployed
TEE on mobile devices is ARM TrustZone [96]. Other architectures also support TEE,
including AMD Platform Security Processor, Apple Secure Enclave and Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX). A compromised mobile OS cannot access data in the secure
world and cannot access hardware protected by the secure world. The secure world runs
an independent trusted OS (will be referred to as TEE OS) with its own set of trusted
applications (also referred to as TA). Popular examples of TEE include Samsung
TIMA [91] which uses TrustZone to provide various security services (e.g. keystore,
trusted user interface), and Trustonic [145] which uses TrustZone to provide security
solutions to various vendors (e.g. mobile payment apps like WeChat and AliPay).

1.3

Component Binding Across OS

In a typical computing system, components in userspace, kernel and hardware interact
with each other to form a single OS context. At userspace level, components can include
processes, and at a finer granularity level, the various libraries (modules) used in the
processes. At kernel level, components can include modules like various device drivers.
At hardware level, components can include various peripherals being used by the system.
Within an OS context, this dissertation uses the term binding to refer to interaction
between two components via OS support. Example of binding can include application
interacting with hardware, process interacting with another process via IPC etc. The key
to the term is that some type of OS support is involved.
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Fig. 1.3.: OS Context and Binding

There can be circumstances where components cannot exist in the same OS context,
but rather exist across two different context. In such situations, if these components need
to interact, an OS-level binding needs to be created (Figure 1.3). The binding can be
created across two similar OSes (Figure 1.4). For example, an app on one Android phone
using the hardware on a different Android phone. In case where the components exist in
different types of OS, a cross-OS binding is needed (Figure 1.4). In this dissertation, two
types of cross-OS bindings are introduced in the designs for secure input interaction
(Truz-UI) and simulation platform for TEE prototyping (Truz-Sim).

1.4

Thesis Statement and Contributions

The thesis statement of this dissertation is that, design solutions transparent to
applications to protect user interaction channels on mobile platform using ARM
TrustZone. The dissertation focuses on the user interaction channels of UI input and
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Fig. 1.4.: Types of Binding

audio I/O for VoIP calls. In support of this statement, this dissertation describes the
following contributions:

1. Truz-UI: Users provide secret data to the smartphone via the interaction channel of
UI input (touch input). To protect user’s secret data, we need to protect the
interaction between the user and the smartphone so that the secret data will be never
given to the normal-world OS. Two common types of touch based interactions are
typing text and confirming an action. A compromised normal-world OS poses a risk
to such interactions. Taking mobile banking as an example, when a user logs in to
the bank’s server, the user needs to type a password, which can be stolen if the OS is
compromised. Second, when the user conducts a money-transfer transaction, the
compromised OS can replace the receiver’s account number with the one belonging
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to the attacker, leading to loss of money. TrustZone can be leveraged to protect such
interactions because of the hardware level isolation it offers. It is important to allow
apps to use TEE via existing normal-world OS APIs and without a need to install
app-specific TA in the secure world. This is a challenging requirement. Without
such support, developers need to make significant changes to their apps to use
TrustZone, discouraging them from using it in their apps.
This dissertation presents a transparent design that allows normal-world apps to
leverage TrustZone via existing OS APIs to protect user interaction via UI input.
The goal is achieved by incorporating generic TrustZone support at the OS level so
that normal-world apps can use TrustZone without the need to put their own code
inside the secure world. Reusing existing APIs can be achieved by moving the
sensitive UI interaction into the secure world, while still maintaining the UI’s
functionality related to its corresponding code in the normal-world app. This is
achieved by creating a cross-OS binding between the UI interaction in the secure
world and the code in the normal-world app. Using this approach, the app developer
requests a secure version of the UI and provides the code to be bound to this UI.
When the UI in the secure world finishes collecting inputs from users, the bound
code in the normal-world app is triggered. This design has been evaluated using
both open and closed source apps in this dissertation. The design has been tested on
the TrustZone-enabled Hikey development board. The performance evaluation
shows that the overhead from Truz-UI is not noticeable to users.
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2. Truz-Call: Users make end-to-end encrypted VoIP calls using various apps on
mobile OS like Android. When the user initiates a VoIP call, the app uses OS APIs
to fetch audio, processes the audio, and sends out the packet over the network
(reverse flow for incoming packets). The app uses a VoIP protocol like SRTP to
encrypt and calculate HMAC for the audio payload (in RTP packets), and send the
encrypted payload to the callee device. With a compromised OS, the user’s privacy
is at risk during the call. TrustZone can be leveraged to protect user’s voice
interaction because of the hardware level isolation it offers. VoIP apps should be
enabled to use TrustZone to protect the user’s conversation while using the existing
OS APIs and existing VoIP protocols, without a need to install app-specific TA in
the secure world. The design should be transparent to developers and to the existing
VoIP infrastructure. This dissertation presents a transparent design to protect user’s
audio I/O during a VoIP call by integrating TEE at essential stages in a VoIP app’s
audio pipeline. The design allows VoIP apps to leverage TrustZone while using
existing OS APIs and VoIP protocol, and provides generic TA support so that no
app-specific TA code is needed. The conversation audio during a VoIP call is
protected from the normal-world OS. The design has been evaluated using an open
source VoIP app Linphone on the TrustZone-enabled Hikey development board.
3. Truz-Sim: TEE research often involves interfacing different types of hardware
peripherals with the TEE OS. This task can be challenging for non-hardware
experts, depending on the available support from the TEE OS vendor. There is a
need for a TEE prototyping environment that can allow researchers to interface
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different category of hardware with the TEE OS irrespective of the available support
from the vendor, and can best retain the quality of data needed for prototyping. To
meet this requirement, this dissertation introduces a simulation based testing
environment that allows reduced setup time and requires no hardware experience for
setup. The idea involves creating a simulation driver in the TEE OS that facilitates a
cross-OS binding between the trusted application in the TEE and hardware attached
to a different OS, for example, on a different board like Raspberry Pi. This allows
TAs in the TEE on a TrustZone-enabled development board like Hikey, to
transparently access hardware attached to a binded board like Pi. The design has
been evaluated for the use cases of a TA needing access to data from camera, GPS
and UI hardware.

1.5

Organization of Dissertation

Chapter 2 provides background on ARM TrustZone and related development boards,
text input & action confirmation in Android, and VoIP calling. Chapter 3 discusses
Truz-UI to provide secure input interaction. Chapter 4 discusses Truz-Call to
provide secure voice interaction for VoIP calling. Chapter 5 discusses hardware simulation
to assist research related to TrustZone. Chapter 6 presents conclusion and future work.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1

ARM TrustZone

The TrustZone technology is a system-wide approach to security that allows building
secure endpoints with a root of trust. Using TrustZone, a System-on-Chip’s (SoC)
hardware and software resources are partitioned to provide security, s.t. the resources exist
in one of two hardware-separated worlds, the secure world for a security subsystem, and
the normal world for everything else (as shown in Figure 1.2). The normal-world software
is not allowed to access the secure-world resources. The concepts of normal and secure
world are applied to various parts of the SoC, including memory, software, bus
transactions, interrupts and peripherals.
The two worlds are partitioned using the hardware logic implemented in the bus
fabric, peripherals and processors. Each physical processor core executes two virtual
cores, one considered secure and the other considered non-secure. The two virtual
processors execute in a time-sliced fashion. The mechanism to context switch between
them is known as monitor mode. The entry to the monitor can be triggered by software
executing the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction. The secure-world comprises of
various software components, including trusted boot, the secure-world switch monitor, a
small trusted OS and trusted apps (or TA ). There are several trusted OSes currently in
development, including OP-TEE [85], T6 [1], Trustonic [145], etc.

11
Secure Boot. As shown in Figure 2.1 [96], after the SoC is powered-on, a ROM-based
bootloader is executed which initializes critical peripherals. It then invokes the device
bootloader located in flash memory. The boot sequence then proceeds through the secure
world OS initialization stages. Once completed, control is passed to the normal world
bootloader. This starts the normal world OS, at which point the system is considered
running. The secure boot sequence includes cryptographic checks to each stage of the
secure world boot process. It aims to assert the integrity of the secure world software,
preventing any unauthorized or maliciously modified software from running.

Fig. 2.1.: Secure Boot

OPTEE OS. This is an open-source TEE OS maintained by Linaro, based on the
GlobalPlatform TEE system architecture specification [54]. It is designed to be
compatible with any isolation technology suitable for TEEs, including TrustZone . In
TrustZone , the OP-TEE OS kernel allows trusted applications (TAs) to run in the user
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space. A TA provides a set of commands, each of which is a function that can be invoked
by the normal world. The OP-TEE kernel forwards the normal-world request to a TA and
returns the result back to the normal world.

2.2

TrustZone Development Boards

To conduct TEE research one needs select a device for testing. Commercial Android
phones with the TrustZone feature have TrustZone locked down by the manufacturers.
Researchers have to instead rely on development boards that can allow modifications to
both normal world and secure world. Since the research done in this dissertation is
focused on mobile OS (primarily Android), the board selected is the one recommended by
Google to run Android upto the year 2020 [53, 106]. The board recommended by Google
is Hikey [125] (shown in Figure 2.2). This dissertation relies on the Hikey 620 board for
testing.

Fig. 2.2.: 96Boards Hikey 620 Development Board

In order to modify the secure world, the development board needs to be supported by a
TEE OS vendor. The vendor would provide a patch to the Android source code released
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by Google, so that when the final version of the code is flashed on the board, both the
normal world and secure world OS can be updated. Fortunately OP-TEE OS provides
support [134] for the Hikey board. This allows a research environment where
modifications can be made at the user and OS levels in both Android and OP-TEE.

2.3

Android Text Input

Android allows users to provide text input to applications. Android supports this via
the input method framework [103]. It has three overall pieces as shown in Figure 2.3.
Applications include UI elements to accept text input. User interaction with these UI
elements requests Android framework to display a keyboard UI for input. The system
displays a keyboard UI based on the currently configured keyboard app (also referred to as
input method editor or IME). User can interact with the keyboard UI to provide text input
to application UI element.

Fig. 2.3.: Android Input Method Framework Overview
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2.3.1

Text Input UI Element

Android allows app developers to create user interface to allow touch interaction with
users. Developers create app components called Activity which create windows in
which developers can place their UI. An application’s UI is represented in XML format.
App developers use a UI element called EditText [101] to accept text input from users.
Listing 2.1 shows an example of an application UI containing two EditText elements.
The corresponding app UI is shown in Figure 2.4. In the example, several attributes are
specified for EditText, including height, width and inputType [105]. The
inputType attribute informs the system whether expected input is just text or special
input like password. Other types include phone, time, date etc.
Listing 2.1: EditText Example
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<LinearLayout
xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/
android"
android:layout_width="match_parent"
android:layout_height="match_parent"
xmlns:tools="http://schemas.android.com/tools"
tools:context="com.example.edittext.MainActivity"
android:orientation="vertical">
<EditText
android:id="@+id/edittext1"
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android:layout_width="200dip"
android:layout_height="50dip"
android:inputType="text"
android:layout_marginLeft="10dip"/>
<EditText
android:id="@+id/edittext2"
android:layout_width="200dip"
android:layout_height="50dip"
android:inputType="textPassword"
android:layout_marginLeft="10dip"/>
</LinearLayout>

Fig. 2.4.: EditText UI Example
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2.3.2

Text Input via Binding

Fig. 2.5.: Keyboard Input via Android Input Method Framework

This section explains how the Android input method framework allows a keyboard app
to provide input to an Android application. Figure 2.5 shows the overall flow. The figure
is divided into three overall steps. Android allows users to install different keyboard apps
and select which one to use via Android’s settings app [61]. When user selects a particular
keyboard app, a system service (running in a privileged process) called
InputMethodManagerService (will be referred to as IMMS) is notified (step ¬).
When the user interacts with an EditText in an Android app, an in-app Android
framework component called InputMethodManager sends an IPC request for the
keyboard UI to IMMS (step ). The IMMS requests currently selected keyboard app to
show its keyboard UI.
Keyboard apps (also referred to as Input Method Editor or IME [102]) are developed
by deriving the Android class InputMethodService [128]. Every IME app has a life
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cycle. The IMMS is responsible for managing the life cycle for the currently selected IME.
One of the important steps in this life cycle is providing the current IME a binding (of type
InputConnection [104]) to the current application. The binding allows the IME to
send text input to the EditText in the app (step ®). Once the text input is completed,
the EditText in the app can get the text entered by the user using the API getText()
(as shown in Listing 2.2).
Listing 2.2: EditText getText() Example
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState)
{
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
EditText editText
= (EditText) findViewById(R.id.
edittext1);
String str = editText.getText().toString();
}
}
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2.4

Android Action Confirmation

This section describes how Android app developers can ask user to confirm an action
and how user interaction with the confirmation UI results in the corresponding code being
triggered in the app. Two common Android components that can be used to ask for user
confirmation are AlertDialog and Activity.

2.4.1

Using AlertDialog for Confirmation

Dialogs [100] commonly consist of a user message and a set of buttons. Listing 2.3
shows an example of how Android developers create a dialog using the AlertDialog
class. Given a confirmation message (set using setMessage()), an app requests a
dialog using the show() API while providing button code for UI buttons. The
confirmation UI runs in the caller app process. The app gets a response upon user
interaction with the dialog UI via Android’s input event handling framework [30].
Figure 2.7 shows an example of a dialog UI.
Listing 2.3: AlertDialog Example
// "this" refers to the containing Activity
AlertDialog.Builder builder
= new AlertDialog.Builder(this);
builder.setMessage("Confirm transfer of $50 to Bob ?")
.setPositiveButton("OK",
new DialogInterface.OnClickListener() {
@Override
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public void onClick(DialogInterface dialog, int
button)
{ /* Handle User Approval */

}

})
.setNegativeButton("Cancel",
new DialogInterface.OnClickListener() {
@Override
public void onClick(DialogInterface dialog, int
button)
{ /* Handle User Cancellation */ }
});
AlertDialog alertDialog = builder.create();
alertDialog.show();

2.4.2

Using Activity for Confirmation

As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, an Activity allows an Android developer to create a
UI for user interaction. To get user confirmation, an app Activity can invoke a second
Activity containing the confirmation UI. Based on the confirmation result,
corresponding code can be triggered in the calling Activity.
The calling Activity specifies the confirmation message as part of an Intent and
uses the startActivityForResult() API for confirmation UI invocation. The UI
may run in same or different process and is invoked via ActivityManagerService.
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Fig. 2.6.: AlertDialog Example

Fig. 2.7.: Confirmation Activity Flow

Upon user interaction with the confirmation activity UI, the activity constructs a result
using finish() and sends to the caller app via the Intent IPC framework. The caller app
gets the response from the confirmation UI via the callback onActivityResult().
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Listing 2.4: Confirmation Activity Request and Response
// Calling Activity
Intent intent = new Intent("com.example.ACTION");
intent.putExtra("msg",
"Confirm transfer of $50 to Bob ?");
startActivityForResult(intent, confirm_request);

// Confirmation Activity
OkButton.setOnClickListener(new OnClickListener() {
@Override
public void onClick(View view) {
setResult(Activity.RESULT_OK);
finish();
// Cancel button can use Activity.RESULT_CANCELED
// Data can also be returned (not used in example)
}
});

// Back to Calling Activity
protected void onActivityResult(int request_code,
int result_code, Intent data) {
if(request_code == confirm_request &&
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result_code == RESULT_OK) {
// Handle user confirmation
}
}

2.4.3

Trigger Confirmation Code via Binding

This section explains how user interaction with the confirmation UI shown via
AlertDialog and Activity triggers corresponding app code via binding support
provided by the OS.

Fig. 2.8.: Trigger Dialog Button Code
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When a user interacts with the dialog UI by pressing either the OK or the Cancel
button, the event associated with user’s touch interaction passes through several stages
before it reaches the AlertDialog in the app. The binding between the UI interaction
and corresponding app code is provided by the OS via the input event handling
framework [30] (shown in Figure 2.8). The UI interaction event is captured by the
hardware and passed onto the Linux device driver in the kernel. Android’s system server
process (a privileged process) receives the event in a component called InputReader.
It forwards it to InputDispatcher which sends the event to the application via the
InputChannel layer in the application process. Android app’s UI is organized as a
hierarchy of UI elements (also referred to as Views). The event is passed down the view
hierarchy in the app. Eventually the event triggers the code associated with the clicked
button via the onClick() callback function.

Fig. 2.9.: Trigger Requesting Activity Code

24
In the case of confirmation via Activity, the flow is similar upto the triggering of
code in the confirmation Activity. Based on whether the user confirmed or denied the
action, the confirmation Activity will use the Intent IPC framework to return the
result to the app requesting confirmation via the system server process (as shown in
Figure 2.9). The binding support provided by the OS thus has two stages, the input event
framework to trigger the code in the confirmation Activity and the Intent IPC
framework to trigger the callback onActivityResult() in the app requesting the
confirmation.

2.5

Voice over IP (VoIP) Call

Fig. 2.10.: VoIP Call Flow

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) [178] allows delivery of voice communications
over Internet Protocol (IP) networks like the Internet. Common protocols used by VoIP
software for secure calling using end-to-end encryption can be found at [174]. From the
data available for protocols used by apps, a common protocol for VoIP with open source
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implementation is SRTP [10] using SIP [6] for call initiation. Figure 2.10 gives a high
level view of the flow involved in connecting a VoIP call. If a caller wants to call a callee,
they will first use the SIP application-layer protocol [6, 22] to exchange information. The
information is exchanged using SDP messages [2] enclosed within SIP messages. The
SIP protocol does not carry any audio data; it is used to initiate a session between the two
end points. Once the connection is established, protocols like RTP [8] are used to deliver
audio between the two end points. RTP is used alongside the RTP Control Protocol
(RTCP). RTP is used to carry media streams, while RTCP is used to monitor transmission
statistics and quality of service. SRTP is a profile of RTP that provides confidentiality,
message authentication, and replay protection to RTP traffic. A sister protocol SRTCP
provides the same features for RTCP. SRTP resides between the RTP application and the
transport layer. It intercepts RTP packets and then forwards an SRTP packet containing
encrypted payload and HMAC on the sending side, and intercepts SRTP packets and
verifies HMAC and decrypts payload to provide an RTP packet up the stack on the
receiving side. SRTP and SRTCP need keys for encryption and HMAC. These keys are
derived from master keys which are set up using a key exchange mechanism. Protocols
used by VoIP to setup master keys include DTLS [15, 19] and ZRTP [18].
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3. TRUZ-UI: SECURE INPUT INTERACTION
3.1

Problem Overview

Users provide sensitive inputs when using Android applications. Two common types
of input are text input and action confirmation (shown in Figure 3.1). In order for an app
to protect text input, users should be able to type a secret (e.g, password) without allowing
the compromised OS to see the secret. Given a protected secret, the app should be able to
send the secret to the authorized server without leaking the secret to the compromised OS.
TrustZone can allow users to type their secret in the right app without leaking to the
untrusted normal-world OS (this dissertation does not cover the sending of secret to
authorized server; covered in existing thesis [180]). In order for an app to enforce user’s
intention, users should be able to confirm an action (e.g., money transfer) and the
compromised OS should not be able to modify the user’s confirmed action. To protect this
interaction, before an important transaction is committed, TrustZone can ask users for
confirmation so that the transaction can be attested (signed using TrustZone) and its
integrity can be preserved. The attested confirmation should allow the receiving server to
verify that the action was confirmed by the user.
The problem of protecting user’s sensitive data and user’s intention has been solved by
TrustZone, but the current solutions like [24, 163] do not satisfy the following constraints:
(a) normal-world apps can reuse existing OS interfaces to leverage the TrustZone support,
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Fig. 3.1.: User Input Interactions

(b) no app-specific logic in the secure world, and (c) minimize Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) while providing generic TEE support. In order to allow an app to protect user input
interaction with minimal changes, the developer should be able to use existing Android
components and APIs, and still be able to leverage TEE support. If an app is required to
replace Android components to integrate TEE support, it would result in a significant
change to the app.

Threat Model. The adversary model is shown in Figure 3.2. The user of the device is
trusted. The normal world that includes the apps and Android OS is untrusted. They may
attempt to steal the user’s secret data and spoof an unauthorized action on the user’s
behalf. The secure world that includes the Trusted Applications (TA) and TEE OS is
trusted. It will protect the user’s confidentiality and integrity when the normal world is
compromised. The server is assumed to be trusted after it is authorized by the user.
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Fig. 3.2.: Input Interaction Threat Model

3.2

Broken Binding between Code and UI

Given the risks to user input interactions from a compromised OS, this dissertation
states the following problem: How to allow the normal-world apps to reuse existing APIs
to protect UI interaction for text input and action confirmation using ARM TrustZone?

Fig. 3.3.: Binding Between Code and UI

Reusing existing APIs can be achieved by moving the sensitive UI interaction into the
secure world, while still maintaining the UI’s functionality related to its corresponding
code in the normal-world app. Taking the example of Android dialog box for action
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confirmation, using a dialog box in an app involves two parts: a UI component and a code
component. As shown in Figure 3.3 (path A), the OS provides a binding between the UI
and code to be triggered. Moving the sensitive UI interaction into the secure world breaks
the existing binding support provided by the OS, as shown in path B. To maintain the
same API interface, we should allow the developer to leverage TEE support while using
the existing dialog box component and should preserve the UI functionality of the dialog
box. The UI’s binding to its corresponding code in the app needs to be maintained. When
the dialog button is clicked in the secure world, the code for the dialog button in the
normal-world app should still be triggered.

3.3

Main Idea: Cross-OS Binding

The approach in this dissertation to achieve the required protection is to move the
sensitive UI interaction into the secure world and to maintain the binding between the UI
interaction and normal-world app code across OSes. This cross-OS binding allows the
apps to leverage the UI in TEE by using existing APIs. In normal cases, an app developer
requests a UI and provides the associated code to be triggered from the UI. Using the
proposed approach, the developer will instead request a secure version of the UI and
provide the code to be bound to this UI. To the developer, the way to request a secure UI is
the same as other UIs, but to the system, when the secure UI needs to be displayed, the
corresponding UI is displayed in the secure world. When the UI in the secure world
finishes collecting inputs from users, the bound code in the normal-world app is triggered.
This dissertation refers to this binding support as TruZ-UI. In order to have no app-specific
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code in the secure world, the proposed design provides generic TAs for keyboard and
confirmation UIs.
In order to protect the user’s interaction in the secure world, the hardware input (touch
digitizer) and display (screen content) need to be protected. To protect the user’s
interaction when the device switches to the secure world, these peripherals should only be
accessible from the secure world. Users also need an indicator to identify whether they are
interacting with the normal world or secure world. The indicator should be exclusively
controlled by the secure world. The proposed design leverages the TrustZone Protection
Controller (TZPC) to allow the secure world to have exclusive control of I/O and the
indicator. When the device is in the secure world, the indicator (LED light) is turned on
and the secure UI is shown on the screen to accept input from the user without leaking
data to the normal world.

3.4

Related Work

Several existing works [162, 163, 168, 169, 179] protect user’s interactions by
leveraging TEE. All of them move the UI interaction into the secure world, and overcome
the broken binding between the UI and corresponding code by moving the code into the
secure world as well (binding is maintained within the secure world). These works require
the developer to provide the TA code to be executed, resulting in an app-specific TA.
VeriUI [165] protects the login web page by porting the WebKit engine and GUI library
into TrustZone. VeriUI is designed to protect the entire web page. However, TruZ-UI
targets the granularity of UI view elements that build the entire Activity. The existing
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works require the developer to write TA code and change the app for the TA code
invocation. This changes how developers write normal world apps, preventing them from
leveraging TEE support by using existing Android components with minimal change to
their apps. This dissertation presents a transparent design that allows normal-world apps
to leverage TrustZone via existing OS APIs to protect user interaction without the need for
app-specific TA code inside the secure world.

3.5

Securing Text Input

This section describes how the user’s interaction for text input is protected by
seamlessly integrating with the secure-world keyboard UI using a cross-OS binding. As
described in Section 2.3, Android apps get user’s text inputs using a UI element called
EditText. When users interact with an EditText, the OS invokes a keyboard. The
OS sets up a binding between the app and the keyboard. The binding allows the keyboard
to send user’s typed characters to the app’s EditText.
To protect user’s interaction with the keyboard, the keyboard UI is moved into the
secure world and a binding is provided between the keyboard UI and app’s EditText
across OSes. Android allows developers to specify a keyboard type when using
EditText. To allow the developer to use the existing EditText component to
leverage the keyboard UI in the secure world, the design adds a special type called secure.
The effect of requesting a secure keyboard type is shown in Figure 3.4. The app’s secure
keyboard request is relayed via the modified Android framework service (InputMethod
ManagerService or IMMS) to a new proxy IME system app (shown as step À). The
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OS sets up a binding between the proxy IME and the requesting app. This proxy IME app
communicates with a generic Keyboard Input TA (step Á), resulting in a secure keyboard
UI being displayed on the screen with the secure LED turned on. While the secure
keyboard is displayed, the normal world does not have access to the screen display or
input. In addition to the keyboard keys, the secure UI also displays a hostname (specified
with the secure EditText configuration) that represents the destination server for the
typed secret. The importance of the hostname is discussed in Section 3.8.

Fig. 3.4.: Seamless Keyboard Binding Across OS

The Keyboard Input TA communicates with the Keyboard UI (step Â) to get the user’s
input. Once the input capture has finished, the secret is saved in the secure-world memory,
which the normal world cannot access, and a reference (corresponding to the saved input)
is returned back to the proxy IME app (step Ã). The reference is a random string of the
same length as the user secret. The proxy IME app uses its binding with the app’s
EditText to return the reference (step Ä), made accessible via EditText’s standard
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API getText() (normally used to get the text typed by the user). A visual feedback is
shown in the normal-world EditText by displaying a set of stars. The reference
returned from the secure world can support different formats for different scenarios such
as passwords, credit card numbers, etc. The design added 1114 LOC in Android
(including 634 LOC for a native bridge component to invoke the secure world) and 710
LOC in the TA. The following sections provide further details on the design on individual
components in Figure 3.4.

Configuring EditText. As shown in Section 2.3.1, an Android developer can declare an
EditText in XML with an inputType. To leverage Truz-UI, the developer will
specify the inputType as secure (as shown in Listing 3.1). When using a secure
type, the developer must also specify a hostname that indicates which server the secret is
associated with. Once the user types a secret in the secure world for the specified
hostname, the the secret is only sent to the corresponding server. This is further explained
in Section 3.8.
Listing 3.1: Normal vs Secure EditText
// Normal EditText
<EditText android:inputType="textPassword" />
// Secure EditText
<EditText android:inputType="secure"
android:allowTo="www.example.com" />
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Modifications to InputMethodManager. The Android app sends a request for
keyboard display to the IMMS via the InputMethodManager. To accommodate the
new secure type for EditText, InputMethodManager was modified s.t. it can
inform IMMS whether the request was being sent on behalf of a secure or non-secure
EditText.

Modifications to IMMS. In order to explain the modifications made to IMMS, this
section first expands Figure 2.5 to show how the binding is provided to the IME app by
IMMS. As shown in Figure 3.5, when an Android application’s UI is initialized, the
application process informs the IMMS regarding a window having gained focus. The
IMMS creates a session with the InputMethodService [128] in the current IME app.
This provides the IME a binding of type InputConnection [104].

Fig. 3.5.: IMMS Providing Binding to IME
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With the modification to InputMethodManager in place, when the user interacts
with a secure EditText, the IMMS will be informed of the EditText type. In order to
allow secure text input, the IMMS needs to interact with the proxy IME app. The IMMS is
aware of one IME at a time (default IME is the one selected via Settings). When IMMS
receives the secure request, the current IME known to IMMS is updated to the proxy IME
app name. This is followed by re-triggering the window focus gain function in the IMMS.
This forces a new session to be created with the proxy IME app, with it being provided a
binding to the current application, as shown in Figure 3.6. Once the user is done with
secure text input, the current IME in IMMS is switched back to the default IME which
allows it to continue providing text input to the app via the provided binding.

Fig. 3.6.: Switch to Proxy IME for Secure EditText

Proxy IME App. This section further explains how the proxy IME app provides a
reference for a user secret typed in the TEE to the EditText in an Android app. As
shown in Figure 3.7 (step À), the IMMS creates a session with the proxy IME app. The
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IMMS does this by invoking bindInput() in the InputMethodService of the IME
app. This allows the proxy IME to get a binding of type InputConnection using the
function getCurrentInputConnection() in onBindInput().

Fig. 3.7.: Proxy IME Commiting Reference Obtained from Keyboard Input TA

To trigger the invocation of the keyboard input TA for secure text input, the design
uses the onWindowShown() function in the proxy IME’s InputMethodService.
onWindowShown() is called immediately before a IME window is shown to the user.
Since secure text input does not require any IME UI in the normal world, when
onWindowShown() is called in the proxy IME, a new thread is started in a separate
Java service, which invokes the keyboard input TA via a native TEE bridge (native
daemon process). The TA accepts user input, stores it in the TEE and returns a reference
(corresponding to the user secret) to the Java service. The reference is then sent to the
EditText in the application using the binding. The Keyboard Input TA will be further
explained in Section 3.9.
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3.6

Securing Action Confirmation

This section describes how the user’s interaction to confirm an action via
AlertDialog and Activity is protected and attested by seamlessly integrating with
a confirmation UI in the secure world using cross-OS binding. As described in
Section 2.4, app developers can ask users to confirm an action by showing a confirmation
message and providing the code to be executed based on whether the user approves or
denies the message. The OS provides a binding between the confirmation UI and the code
provided by the app. Such user interactions face risk in case the normal-world OS is
compromised, as the OS can confirm a request on behalf of the user or change the
message confirmed before it is sent to the server. To allow the developer to leverage TEE
support for user’s confirmation while using existing components, cross-OS binding is
provided along the existing paths for AlertDialog and Activity components.

3.6.1

Action Confirmation using AlertDialog

As described in Section 2.4.1, an app developer requests a dialog using the show()
API by providing the message to be confirmed. The app gets back the result via Android
input event handling framework which triggers the onClick() callback for the dialog
button. Figure 3.8 shows the TruZ-UI design to allow secure confirmation UI integration
for apps. The cross-OS binding is setup between the confirmation UI interaction in TEE
and the onClick() callback in calling app. The design allows the developer to request a
secure confirmation UI via AlertDialog using the existing API by adding a secure
configuration. The secure confirmation UI request is sent by the modified AlertDialog

38
class and relayed via a TEEBridge service (step À). This causes the invocation of a
generic confirmation TA , which results in the switching of the screen to show the secure
confirmation UI. The normal-world OS cannot access the display or input at this stage.

Fig. 3.8.: AlertDialog Confirmation using TEE

The secure confirmation UI allows the user to approve a message and get it signed by
the secure world. As part of the secure configuration, the developer also specifies a
hostname, which reflects the server for which the message is being attested, and is
displayed in the confirmation UI along with the message. The hostname provides the user
a context of the requested confirmation. The hostname serves as a reference to lookup the
attestation key in the secure world. Each attestation key is bound with the hostname in the
TEE. The key is setup in the secure world when the user first logs in to the app (discussed
in Section 3.8).
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Upon user’s confirmation (step Á), the message is attested (HMAC signed). The
attestation is generated using the key and displayed message, using a nonce to make it
non-replayable. In order to improve the user’s readability of the message, the developer is
allowed to add additional formatting in the message to highlight sensitive fields (e.g., a
destination account and amount in case of money transfer). On user’s approval, the
attestation is returned to the normal-world app. To ensure the confirmation attestation can
be returned to existing component, the result is returned via existing callback
(onClick()) for AlertDialog. To return the attestation to the dialog button code,
the cross-OS binding uses the event handling framework via an existing service (step Â)
in the system server process called InputManagerService. Using the API
injectInputEvent(), a modified MotionEvent [133] is sent carrying an
attestation (MotionEvent is extended to have an extra field called attestation). The
event triggers the app button’s onClick() callback (step Ã) where the attestation can be
retrieved.
Since the attestation obtained by the app does not contain any user secret, it can be
sent to the server using normal-world HTTP/SSL flow. The server can use the attestation
to verify the integrity of the request before taking action. The only difference is the
addition of the attestation argument in the request. Since the message approved by the
user using TruZ-UI consists of fixed and variable parts (for example, “transfer $500 to
John” contains “transfer .. to .. ” as fixed part and the arguments “$500” and “John” as
variable parts), the request will have to indicate the fixed and variable parts to allow the
server to regenerate the approved user message. By maintaining a strong mapping
between the request URI and fixed part of the message, the server can recalculate the
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attestation based on arguments in the request, and verify it against the attestation in the
request to approve the requested action. The presented attestation scheme currently only
applies to user understandable message and cannot work for app-specific semantic like
GUID, which users cannot understand. The design added 820 LOC in Android and 680
LOC in the TA (the LOC count includes changes for Section 3.6.2). The design used the
native bridge mentioned in Section 3.5.

Configuring Secure Dialog Request. In case of dialog, configuring involves adding an
additional configuration to provide a common name (as shown in Line 5 in Listing 3.2).
Once the user has confirmed the action in TEE, the attestation will be returned to the
onClick() callback and can be accessed as shown in Line 12-13 in Listing 3.2.
Listing 3.2: Secure Dialog Request
1 // "this" refers to the containing Activity
2 AlertDialog.Builder builder
3

= new AlertDialog.Builder(this);

4 builder.setMessage("Confirm transfer of $50 to Bob ?")
5

.attestTo("www.example.com")

6

.setPositiveButton("OK",

7

new DialogInterface.OnClickListener() {

8

@Override

9

public void onClick(DialogInterface dialog,

10
11

int button)
{
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12

AlertDialog dialog = (AlertDialog) d;

13

String attestation = dialog.getAttestation();

14

/* Handle User Approval */

15

}

16

});

17 AlertDialog alertDialog = builder.create();
18 alertDialog.show();

3.6.2

Action Confirmation using Activity

As described in Section 2.4.2, an app developer requests a confirmation Activity
using the startActivityForResult() API by providing the message to be
confirmed in an Intent. The result is received back via the Intent IPC framework. This
triggers the onActivityResult() callback. Figure 3.9 shows the TruZ-UI design to
allow secure confirmation UI integration when apps use Activity. The cross-OS
binding is setup between the confirmation UI interaction in TEE and
onActivityResult() callback in calling app. The design allows the developer to
request a secure confirmation UI via Activity using the existing API by adding a
secure configuration.
To request a secure confirmation, the developer can configure the Intent as secure
while using the existing Activity API. The request is relayed by a proxy Activity
(step À), which is provided as part of a system app. The proxy Activity doesn’t have a
UI; it instead allows transparency as the requesting app can use the existing Activity API.
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Fig. 3.9.: Activity Confirmation using TEE

The proxy forwards the request to the TEEBridge service, which invokes a generic
confirmation TA . Once the user confirms the action, the message is attested (step Á). The
attestation is returned to the caller app via the ProxyActivity (step Â), which returns
the result to the caller by wrapping the attestation in an Intent. This triggers the
onActivityResult() callback where the attestation can be retrieved.

Configuring Secure Activity Request. In case of activity, configuring involves using a
different action in the Intent. The action will correspond to the
TEEProxyActivity. Configuration will also involve setting the message to be attested
and the common name as part of the Intent (Lines 2-5 in Listing 3.3). The design
assumes that the TEEProxyActivity will be provided by vendors as part of a system
app. The app developer can target an action (like the SECURE CONFIRM ACTION shown
in Listing 3.3) that can be agreed upon by vendors to indicate the proxy Activity.

43
Vendors can ensure that the action is only received by TEEProxyActivity from their
system app.
Listing 3.3: Secure Activity Request
1 Intent intent
2

= new Intent("com.example.SECURE CONFIRM ACTION");

3 intent.putExtra("msg",
4

"Confirm transfer of $50 to Bob ?");

5 intent.putExtra("attestTo", "www.example.com");
6 startActivityForResult(intent, secure_request);
7
8 protected void onActivityResult(int request_code,
9

int response_code, Intent data) {

10

if(request_code == secure_request &&

11

response_code == RESULT_OK) {

12

String attestation

13

= data.getStringExtra("attestation");

14

}

15 }

3.6.3

Attestation Using Android Keystore

In addition to the existing work discussed in Section 3.4, app developers today can use
Android’s keystore support to have a message attested (signed) using a private key stored
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inside the secure-world and have a policy that allows use of the key only when user
authenticates with a fingerprint [62]. Since fingerprint hardware can only be accessed in
the secure world [108], this allows the developer to get a message signed with a TEE
protected key only when user authenticates in the secure world. This design assumes that
the key material is generated before the normal-world OS is compromised. For an app
relying on keystore and fingerprint, three problems can occur: (a) user cannot see what
message is being confirmed and signed; normal world OS could alter the msg to be
signed, (b) normal-world OS can fool the app and its server into thinking that the private
key is hardware backed when generated, while keeping the key pair in the normal-world
(c) when app requests user authentication for use of the private key, the normal-world OS
could provide positive response to the app without asking the user.
In order to not face the above issues, the app’s server needs a guarantee that the
message is signed using a key visible only to the secure-world, and the user needs a
guarantee that message is signed only if the user approves it in the secure world, with
normal-world not having any way to alter the message once it is approved. The design
discussed in this dissertation provides these features.

3.7

User Involved Access Control

The OS depends on the user’s action to decide how to provide confidentiality and
integrity protection for user intended activities. For instance, when a user types a
password, he/she depends on the OS (based on the app picked) to provide confidentiality,
i.e., the password should go to the right app and its corresponding server. When a user
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confirms an action in an app, he/she expects the OS to maintain the integrity of the action,
i.e., the action that the user confirmed is sent to the server, without being modified. The
OS provides confidentiality and integrity guarantees by enforcing access control based on
a policy. Part of this policy is decided by the OS, but the other half comes from the user
and is derived from the user action. When the user types a password, the OS depends on
the user’s app selection to decide which app gets the password. When a user confirms an
action for a server, the OS can only guarantee that the context of the action will not be
modified after the user’s approval; the main job of the user is to proofread and ensure that
the context of the action indeed matches the user’s intention.

Fig. 3.10.: Truz-UI Context Verification by User

In Truz-UI’s threat model, the normal-world OS fails to provide such security
guarantees for users when it is compromised. The only solution for users to protect their
security sensitive activities is to convey their intentions to TrustZone to leverage its
confidentiality and integrity guarantees. When the user needs to get secure text input or
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secure confirmation using Truz-UI, the user needs to verify two things (a) the secure
LED is on, and (b) the common name of the website. This is shown in Figure 3.10. The
effectiveness of using a secure LED and a common name has been measured via user
evaluation in a related work [180].

3.8

Sending TEE Protected Data to Server

When an app wants to send TEE-protected data corresponding to reference(s) to the
server, it will use the existing HTTP/SSL API. To use the secure world to construct an
encrypted packet containing the user’s secrets, one will need to integrate TEE with HTTP
and SSL. This part is not solved in this dissertation, and instead is covered in a related
work called TruZ-HTTP and Split-SSL [180]. Using this related work, the reference
acts as glue among application, HTTP, and SSL layers. The normal world cannot see the
user secret(s), and will get an encrypted packet constructed in the secure world. The
packet will be sent to the server via the normal-world TCP/IP stack. This is shown in
Figure 3.11.
As stated in Section 3.5, when getting user input in the TEE, the secure UI also
displays a hostname (specified with the secure EditText configuration). By typing the
secret for that hostname, the user acknowledges that the secret can only be sent to the
server with the displayed hostname. The SSL TA enforces the policy of sending the
secret only to the corresponding server. Section 3.6 states that when the user confirms an
action in the secure world, the message is attested using an attestation key. The key is
setup in the secure world when the user first logs in to the app. This is done by the SSL
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Fig. 3.11.: Connection Between Truz-UI and Truz-HTTP/Split-SSL Works

TA. The confirmation TA uses the displayed hostname as a reference to lookup the
attestation key in the secure world. It can then use the key in the secure world to attest the
message confirmed by the user.

3.9

Hardware Implementation

All the commercial Android phones with the TrustZone feature have TrustZone locked
down by the manufacturers. In order to test Truz-UI, a TrustZone -enabled prototype
platform was built that could run Android OS (version 7.0) in the normal world and run
OP-TEE OS [85] (version 2.1.0) in the secure world. The prototype was built using the
HiKey development board. The prototype uses a TFT LCD panel as the screen. The
screen uses the HDMI interface for display and the USB interface for touch control.

Hardware Setup Overview. The hardware implementation provides isolation for the
user’s input and display. Even though both worlds share the same screen, when the secure
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world controls it, the normal world cannot access the I/O of the screen. The isolation is
achieved at the circuit level. As shown in Figure 3.12, the I/O of the screen is connected to
a multiplexer/demultiplexer. The multiplexer takes the HDMI signal from both the worlds
and outputs one of the signals to the screen. The demultiplexer takes the touch input from
the screen and gives it to one of the worlds. A switch is used to control the
multiplexer/demultiplexer. Each world has separate I/O ports that connect to
multiplexer/demultiplexer. The control of the switch is accessible to secure-world I/O
ports only. To indicate to users which world they are interacting with, the secure world
will turn on a LED when the device is in the secure world. The TrustZone Protection
Controller (TZPC) is configured to allow the secure world to have exclusive control of the
switch, LED indicator, and secure-world I/O ports.

Fig. 3.12.: Hardware Setup Overview for Truz-UI

Hardware Setup Wiring. Figure 3.13 shows the wiring of hardware setup used for
testing Truz-UI. It follows the overview diagram in Figure 3.12. The touch screen is
connected to an input switch (input demultiplexer) and a HDMI display switch (output
multiplexer). The normal and secure world run on the Hikey board. The HDMI and USB
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connected to the Hikey provide display output and input for the normal world. Due to lack
of vendor driver support, the secure world cannot directly provide input/output for the
touch screen. Due to this reason, the secure world relies on a Raspberry Pi board
(interfaced via UART). The UART is only accessible to the secure world using TZPC. The
HDMI and USB connected to the Pi board provide the display output and input for the
secure world. The UIs for the keyboard input TA and confirmation TA are provided by
Python code running on the Pi board. The TAs running in the secure world get results via
UART. The input switch and the HDMI display switch are controlled by the Pi board,
which in turn is controlled by secure world. There is an LED on each switch which
indicates which world is in control.

Fig. 3.13.: Hardware Test Setup for Truz-UI
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Keyboard Input and Confirmation TA. In order to allow the TA to interact with the Pi
board, the TA needs to be able to access the UART driver. The OP-TEE OS version 2.1.0
comes with the PL011 UART driver. To provide access, the prototype modified the
userspace library libutee and the OP-TEE OS kernel (adding 150 LOC) to add new
system call so that the TA could utilize the driver.

Screen Transition. Since the normal world and secure world share the same screen,
when secure text input or confirmation is needed, the secure world takes control of the
screen and shows the secure UI. An example of this is shown in Figure 3.14 for the case of
secure text input in a banking app. An additional secure LED was added in the wiring of
Figure 3.13 to take the picture.

Fig. 3.14.: Screen Transition for Truz-UI

51
3.10

Security Analysis

This section presents the security analysis of TruZ-UI. The design can enforce user’s
intentions in the presence of either a malicious app or a malicious OS. The analysis uses
the stronger attack model and considers the malicious OS as the attacker. The analysis
assumes that the TrustZone hardware platform is trusted and the secure boot process has
initialized the integrity-verified OP-TEE OS. Hardware attacks, crypto attacks, side
channel attacks, and DOS attacks are considered out of scope.

TruZ-UI Secure Text Input Analysis. As discussed in Section 3.5, normal-world apps
can leverage the TruZ-UI to capture user’s secrets (text input) in the secure world. The
adversary’s goals include monitoring the secret typed, accessing the content displayed,
and reading the secret saved in the secure world.
As mentioned in the hardware setup in Section 3.9, the secure world shows the secure
UI and gets the screen input through the multiplexer/demultiplexer. The switch controls
the USB demultiplexer and HDMI multiplexer. The switch is only controlled by the
secure-world I/O ports. The TrustZone Protection Controller (TZPC) was configured to
allow the secure world to have exclusive control over the switch and secure-world I/O
ports. The security analysis of TruZ-UI secure text input involves three properties. The
first security property is that the secret typed in the secure world cannot be monitored by
the normal-world OS. Since the normal world can neither switch the screen USB input nor
read the screen input via the secure-world I/O port, the normal world cannot monitor the
user’s input in the secure world. This prevents keylogging attacks. The second property is
that the content displayed from the secure world is not accessible to the normal-world OS.
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The normal world can neither switch HDMI output of the screen nor observe the screen
content over the secure-world I/O port, preventing it from observing content displayed in
the secure world. This helps prevent screen capture attacks. The third security property is
that the secret typed in the secure world is never disclosed to the normal world. When a
normal-world app uses a secure EditText, the secret typed in the secure world is saved
in the secure-world memory. Only the reference of the secret is returned to the normal
world.

TruZ-UI Attestation Analysis. As discussed in Section 3.6, normal-world apps can
request a secure confirmation UI that provides an attestation for user’s approved message.
The adversary’s goals include forging the approval of the message on behalf of the user
and forging or replaying the attestation sent to the server.
The security analysis involves three properties. The first security property is that the
attestation generated is always tied to the message displayed in the secure world. The
attestation is computed based on the message that the user approves in the secure world
when the content matches with the user’s intention. The second security property is that
the normal world cannot forge user’s approval of the message that is displayed in the
secure world by performing any type of key injection. This is because the normal world
cannot access the touch input when the device is in the secure mode (explained in
section 3.10). The message is attested in the secure world only when the user approves it.
The third security property is that the attestation generated in the secure world cannot be
forged by the normal-world OS. The attestation key is generated inside the secure world
and only saved in the secure-world memory. The normal world cannot forge an attestation
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without the keys. Furthermore, a nonce is appended when computing the attestation to
avoid replayability.

3.11

Evaluation

In this section, Truz-UI’s design is evaluated from three aspects, namely,
effectiveness, ease of adoption, and performance. The design was tested on a variety of
use cases using real-world applications. Ease of adoption was measured for the
developers. To evaluate complete use cases, the evaluation utilized the existing work
Truz-HTTP and Split-SSL [180] when data (corresponding to reference) stored in
the secure world by Truz-UI needed to be sent to a server.

3.11.1

Effectiveness

To demonstrate the effectiveness, new security features were added to open-source
applications by making changes on the client side and server side (if needed). Seven
open-source applications were modified, including Elgg [46] and Drupal [44]. To measure
the effectiveness in the case of closed-source apps, the OS was modified only for
evaluation purpose.

Sensitive file upload. This case study demonstrated how normal-world apps can be
enabled to upload a TEE-protected file (e.g., a tax file, a medical record that is only
needed by the server, not the client) to the authorized server without adding any
app-specific code in the secure world. In contrast, DroidVault [163] requires the
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app-specific code in the secure world. The open-source app called Seafile was used to
act as the tax e-file server. The Seafile client allows a user to enter a secret (e.g., tax
account) via EditTextand save it in a file. The app can then upload the tax file to its
server using HTTP/SSL. The Seafile app was modified to allow the user to enter the
secret file content using a secure EditText. The user types the file content using the
TruZ-UI keyboard, and the file content is saved in the secure world. The normal world
gets a reference, which is saved in a file. When the user asks for the file to be uploaded to
the server, the app issues an HTTP request using the normal-world file content (containing
the reference). TruZ-HTTP and Split-SSL are utilized to allow the file to be uploaded
successfully to the Seafile server.

TrustZone-enabled Android authenticator. To demonstrate that the design can
support the Account Manager framework (used to manage Android passwords), an
authenticator app for Elgg was written. When a third-party app needs to login to the Elgg
server, it will ask the Account Manager, which invokes the authenticator app’s login
Activity. This Activity uses a secure EditTextto trigger the TruZ-UI
keyboard in the secure world. Once the user types the password, a reference is given back
to the Elgg authenticator. The Elgg authenticator then sends the reference to the server
using TruZ-HTTP and Split-SSL. The password reference is saved by the Account
Manager, which is not even aware that what it stores is not the actual password. This
allows Account Manager to manage the authentication requests for third-party apps
without storing the actual passwords in the normal world. The design requires no change
to the Account Manager framework.
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Attested post. Drupal was installed on an Ubuntu server and the handling of the post
content type was modified to verify attestation. The Drupal Editor app [45] was used as
a client. The app was modified to have an attested post functionality, which allows the
user to confirm the post in the secure world before it is sent to the server. The proxy
Activity (refer Section 3.6.2) was utilized for this test to integrate with the confirmation
TA. The app sends the secure world attestation along with the post message to the server.
The Drupal server verifies the attestation before it publishes the post.

Protecting secrets. Apps written today need to protect different types of user’s secrets.
TruZ-UI allows developers to protect any text-based secret that can be typed in apps.
This was evaluated by using seven different open-source apps, including Friendica, Elgg,
Drupal, MustardMod (with GNUSocial), Kandroid (with Kanboard), Redmine and
Seafile. Minimal changes were made to the apps corresponding to the secrets that needed
protection. This involved modifying the layout file containing the
EditTextcorresponding to those secrets and configuring them as secure. The types of
secrets protected in apps during the tests included login credentials and payment
information.

3.11.2

Ease of Adoption

The ease of adoption was evaluated by measuring how much effort developers need to
make to add TrustZone support to their apps. The evaluation was conducted using both
open and closed-source apps. For open-source, both the client and server code was
downloaded from public Github repositories [47]. For closed-source, apps were
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downloaded from Google Play. To ensure their diversity, apps were downloaded from
different categories, including shopping, traveling, productivity, finance, medical,
business, food, etc.
Seven open-source apps were modified, by either adding new features to them (e.g.,
attestation) or leveraging TrustZone to protect their existing features (e.g., login). The
time spent on the modification and the number of lines of code (LOC) modified for each
app was recorded. Table 3.1 shows the result. 1 LOC for TruZ-HTTP, 2 LOC for secure
EditText, 4 LOC for secure confirmation. As shown in Table 3.1, for apps to protect
their login credentials, only 3 lines of code are modified on the client side and the time
spent on making the changes was within an hour. For server-side changes, 4 lines of code
were needed to extract the secret data from the HTTP request. In case of attestation, the
attestation logic varied depending on what to attest. The overall change on the server side
was less than 20 lines of code.
Table 3.1: Evaluation Results for Open-Source Apps
Test Case
Drupal Attested Post
Elgg Attested Payment
Elgg Authenticator
Drupal Login
GNUSocial Login
Kandroid Login
Redmine Login
Owncloud Login
Seafile Upload

Client
4 LOC
4 LOC
3 LOC
3 LOC
3 LOC
3 LOC
3 LOC
3 LOC
3 LOC

Server
20 LOC
12 LOC
4 LOC
4 LOC
4 LOC
4 LOC
4 LOC
4 LOC
4 LOC

Time Spent
1 hour
30 mins
30 mins
30 mins
40 mins
30 mins
30 mins
40 mins
50 mins

To evaluate apps from the market, closed-source apps were enabled to leverage
TrustZone. To protect users’ secret in the secure world, the apps were modified to protect
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user’s sensitive data, including passwords, credit card numbers, and files containing a
secret. The closed-source apps were repackaged by configuring some selected
EditTextin their layout files, so when sensitive data needs to be provided by users, the
TruZ-UI keyboard is invoked and the data are typed inside the secure world. To protect
users’ confirmation in the secure world, the confirmation UI name (Activity or
Activity containing AlertDialog) and the corresponding message was hardcoded
in a configuration file. The system used the file to get a message (corresponding to a
confirmation UI request) attested by the user in the secure world. To verify on the server
side, a proxy server was setup to verify the attestation. The secure world shares the SSL
keys with the proxy server (using existing work [180]), so it can intercept all the SSL
traffic. Configruration files were created to inform HTTP and SSL layers (based on [180])
whether the data to be sent to the server contains the TEE-protected secret, attestation
message or attestation keys. All configuration files and the proxy server are only for
demonstration purpose. If the apps could be modified, such files are not needed.
31 apps were collected, including Chase, Github, Southwest Airline, Piazza, Priceline,
Box, Poshmark, Listonic, Dropbox, MediaFire, Applebee’s, Discover, Secure Cloud
Storage, etc. 15 apps were used for TEE-protected login, 5 for TEE-protected payment, 2
for TEE-protected file upload, and 9 for attestation. The results are shown in Table 3.2.
All the experiments were successful, except two cases in the login category. The reason
for the failures is not representative; they calculate HMAC of the HTTP request inside the
payload. If the source code was available for these failed cases, they could be made to
work.
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Table 3.2: Evaluation Result for Closed-Source Apps
Test Case
Success/Total

3.11.3

Login
13/15

Payment
5/5

Upload
2/2

Attestation
9/9

Performance

Experiments were designed to measure the round-trip time for code to secure UI
invocation and back. The overhead (average over 20 trials) of the implementation adds
over the normal case by not counting the drawing time or the user’s input time. The
TruZ-UI keyboard integration adds 123 ms overhead. The confirmation UI integration
adds 53 ms overhead. In TruZ-UI keyboard integration, the overhead is caused by the
interaction between the proxy IME app and the keyboard input TA. In the confirmation UI
integration, the overhead is caused by the interaction between the TEE bridge service and
the confirmation TA. Overall, the delay caused by the overhead for the TruZ-UI is barely
noticeable when users interact with TruZ-UI.

3.12

Publication

The Truz-UI design has been published in 2018 as part of a joint work in the paper
titled TruZ-Droid: Integrating TrustZone with Mobile Operating System [181]. The
dissertation author was the second author in this paper publication.
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4. TRUZ-CALL: SECURE VOICE INTERACTION FOR VOIP
CALLING
4.1

Problem Overview

Mobile phones are one of the most common devices used by people today, with the
basic function of calling another person. In recent years, VoIP apps such as Signal [25]
and Whatsapp [14] have become popular ways for making a call. Unfortunately the
mobile OS platforms (like Android) on which these apps run have made the use of VoIP
apps more risky in terms of user privacy. The problem is also compounded by the fact that
various actors are trying to compromise Android OS including hacking groups [55] and
nation states [82]. The ever present risk of mobile OS compromise can limit one of the
important rights in human society i.e. freedom of speech. In context of mobile phones,
this translates to being able to call anyone and talk on any subject without fear of someone
else listening on the call. Today different types of users need to have a secure means of
calling, including activists, journalists, government employees etc.
A high level view of how a VoIP call works in shown in Figure 4.1. Once the VoIP call
is established, a caller/callee provides audio input and receives audio output via the
device’s audio peripherals. A compromised OS can listen to user’s conversation during a
VoIP call. TrustZone can be leveraged to protect user’s voice interaction because of the
hardware level isolation it offers.
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Fig. 4.1.: VoIP Call Overview

In order to protect user’s voice interaction during a call, a VoIP app show be able to
leverage TrustZone to establish a end-to-end encrypted VoIP call. This dissertation states
the following problem: How can we allow a VoIP app to transparently leverage ARM
TrustZone to protect users conversation from an untrusted OS during a VoIP call ? The
design should be transparent to VoIP apps. It should allow the VoIP app to use existing OS
APIs used and VoIP protocols. The design should require no change to the VoIP
infrastructure.
VoIP apps contain several stages that work in parallel as a pipeline, each stage feeding
data to the next (Figure 4.2 (left)). The app uses OS APIs to fetch audio, processes the
audio, and sends out packets over the network (reverse flow for incoming packets). The
app uses a VoIP protocol like SRTP to encrypt and calculate HMAC for the audio payload
(in RTP packets), and send the encrypted payload to the callee device. A transparent
design involves preserving the relative structure of the VoIP app software stack, as it
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affects the way developers write VoIP apps. This dissertation focuses on the essential
VoIP app stages of audio I/O, RTP packet construction / parsing, SRTP, and network I/O.

Fig. 4.2.: VoIP App Stages and Secure VoIP Requirement

Since the design would leverage TrustZone, it should minimize the TCB in the secure
world. This includes providing generic TA support so that app-specific TA code is not
required in the secure world. During the TEE protected VoIP call, the audio peripherals
should be controlled by the secure world and the user’s conversation audio should be
protected from the normal-world OS (Figure 4.2 (right)).
A challenge that is encountered in designing a system like Truz-Call is latency.
Since VoIP is a real time system, if the normal world stack invokes TEE at one or more
points, it will add computation time to the VoIP call. Any additional time will add latency
and will thus affect voice quality. The design should reduce end-to-end latency overhead.
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Another challenge is the hardware setup to do prototype evaluation. In TEE research,
interfacing hardware peripherals like mic and speaker with the TEE OS on a development
board can be challenging for non-hardware experts with limited resources. In order to
evaluate the design, a hardware setup needs to be used that allows easier prototyping.

Fig. 4.3.: Voice Interaction Threat Model

Threat Model and Assumptions. The normal world (including Android OS and the
VoIP app) is not trusted. The secure world, including the TEE OS and trusted applications
(TA), is trusted. The user using the device is trusted. The device hardware, including the
audio peripherals (mic and speaker), is trusted. The VoIP network is not trusted, although
Truz-Call does not try to protect against network based attacks. Truz-Call is
targeted for users who want to securely call friends, family or someone they know
personally or have met before. It does not cover key exchange done by VoIP apps (at the
beginning of the call), which is why it cannot be used to call an unknown person. To use
the design discussed in this dissertation, two users need to exchange a secret phrase using
a secure side channel (this will be used to derive the key). Truz-Call can be extended
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to add key exchange using the TEE by splitting protocols like DTLS [19]. It is also
assumed that the user wants to use Truz-Call for a one-to-one call, and not for
conference calling.

4.2

Factors Influencing TEE Integration Design

Fig. 4.4.: TEE Integration Design Factors

When designing a secure solution on mobile platform by integrating TEE into a
normal world stack (Figure 4.4 (right)), three factors need to be balanced (Figure 4.4
(left)). The solution needs to provide security, i.e. preventing the compromised
normal-world OS from accessing sensitive data. This is achieved using references.
Alongside references, there will data associated with the reference in secure-world
memory. The design (structure) of the reference impacts transparency in the normal world
stack, as stages of the normal-world stack operate on the reference data. TEE is integrated
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and invoked at multiple stages in the normal-world stack. The number of normal-world
TEE integration points and the way data is managed in the TEE impacts overall latency.

4.3

Related Work

The idea of having a secure VoIP call on an untrusted OS has been discussed before in
the work ”A Hardware-Assisted Proof-of-Concept for Secure VoIP Clients on Untrusted
Operating Systems” [156]. This existing work has been done on a Xilinx board, which
includes a PS section and PL section (FPGA). The PS and PL sections are analogous to
normal and secure world respectively. The work is intended for devices like VoIP phones
(handset). They used the Linphone app [5] for testing and modified it such that for
incoming SRTP packet, the header information and payload is forwarded to secure
hardware, and for outgoing packet the SRTP header and encrypted payload are sent from
secure hardware to the normal world. There are several differences between this existing
work and Truz-Call: (1) Commercial mobile phones don’t rely on FPGA; instead they
ship with ARM boards that have TrustZone. The existing work does not address any
challenges related to leveraging TrustZone for secure VoIP. (2) Xillinux OS does not
reflect mainstream mobile OS like Android. The existing work does not address
leveraging TrustZone in mobile OS audio stacks to allow existing Audio APIs to be used.
(3) A VoIP app has a flow for handling audio packets. In the existing work the RTP layer
has been eliminated from the normal-world app flow as the design forwards
header/payload with secure hardware at the SRTP layer. This breaks the relative structure
of the software stack used to implement a VoIP app. The design does not utilize Audio
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APIs in the normal world to record/play audio data which changes the way developers
write VoIP apps. Moving header generation/parsing functionality into the secure world
increases the TCB as only part of the SRTP layer remains in the normal world. TruzCall’s
goal is to maintain the relative structure of the essential parts of the software stack for a
VoIP app and avoid moving unnecessary components into the TEE. In summary, the
existing work [156] is not transparent (breaks app stack structure and makes the app no
longer use OS audio APIs) and has a large TCB.
DRM can provide secure audio/video playback using TEE, but the reference design
and TEE data management used in DRM do not apply to VoIP. TrustCall [143] is a
commerical product that leverages TEE for secure calling [40]. Based on the information
available online, it is not designed for transparency to Android VoIP apps. It only works
for the TrustCall app [144]. It also relies on TrustCall specific TA being present inside the
TEE [31, 32]. Truz-Call is designed to be transparent to any VoIP app that wants to
use existing OS APIs for a SIP/SRTP based call. Truz-Call provides generic TA
support, avoiding having app-specific TA code inside the TEE.

4.4

Secure VoIP Calling Problem Scope

In order to design Truz-Call, the problem scope needs to be narrowed down. The
problems scope pertains to the type of protocol support to be provided and whether all
VoIP app stages should be supported.
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4.4.1

Protocol Support

VoIP apps can be written to conduct a call in plain text (using protocol combination
like SIP + RTP) or can choose to use end-to-end encryption to protect the user’s
conversation. Common protocols used by VoIP software for secure calling using
end-to-end encryption can be found at [174]. From the data available for protocols used
by apps, a common protocol for VoIP with open source implementation is SRTP [10]
using SIP [6] for call initiation. Popular apps like WhatsApp rely on SRTP [149]. Instead
of providing TEE support to protect calls for all VoIP apps, this dissertation focuses on the
problem scope of providing TEE support for apps that already provide end-to-end
encryption (using SIP and SRTP), but face a privacy risk due to a compromised OS.
Section 2.5 provides more information on how VoIP apps setup a call using SIP and
SRTP.

4.4.2

VoIP App Computation Stages

For a VoIP app using SIP and SRTP, audio processing is conducted in several stages
as shown in Figure 4.5. The stages comprise audio I/O, audio computation (like
resampling, compression), RTP packet construction / parsing, SRTP, and network I/O.
One of the stages in Figure 4.5 is marked as computation. To improve audio quality
and reduce bandwidth requirements, a VoIP app applies several types of additional
computation on the audio data. For audio data read from the mic, computations applied
can include read resampling (downsampling), volume adjustment, equalization and
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Fig. 4.5.: VoIP App Stages

compression. Before playing received audio, applied computations can include
decompression, volume adjustment, equalization, and upsampling.
There is a performance penalty involved in supporting the additional computation
stages. End-to-end latency increases with every stage that uses TEE (due to invocation
time). Supporting the additional computation stages will add performance overhead. It
will also adds to the TCB in the secure world. For a design using references for audio
data, the additional audio computations can tamper with the reference data. For the
problem scope of Truz-Call, the additional computation stages are disabled. The
design focuses on the essential stages of audio I/O, RTP packet construction / parsing,
SRTP, and network I/O. The design sacrifices audio quality for security.
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4.5

Main Idea

Figure 4.6 shows the main idea of Truz-Call. The various stages in a VoIP stack
work in parallel as a pipeline, each stage feeding data to the next. The audio pipeline in
the VoIP app consists of some essential stages. To allow the VoIP pipeline to maintain its
existing flow while keeping user’s conversation audio in the TEE, the design invokes TEE
at the stages for audio API usage and SRTP. This allows the use of the existing relative
structure of the software stack.

Fig. 4.6.: Truz-Call Design Overview

At the beginning of the call, TEE takes control of the audio peripherals. This can be
done using TrustZone hardware features and has been done in other works like
SeCloak [161]. In order for the TEE invocation at several stages of the VoIP stack to work
together, the design uses a reference design pattern. When the VoIP app asks for audio
using existing APIs, the TEE invocation provides it a reference to the real audio data
(saved in TEE) via the existing normal-world OS audio APIs. The app then proceeds with
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preparing the RTP packet. When the flow reaches the SRTP layer and it needs to encrypt
the data in the RTP payload (which is a reference). The design invokes the TEE and
passes the audio data reference. The TEE encrypts the data corresponding to the reference
and returns the encrypted payload and HMAC to the SRTP layer to allow the VoIP app flow
to continue. This way only essential cryptography operations for SRTP are moved into the
TEE. The reverse flow happens for packets received by the device for playback.
The Truz-Call design has been tested on the open-source VoIP app Linphone [5].
It should be emphasized that the changes made to the Linphone app are within the various
libraries used by Linphone. The app is composed of several modules, including libraries
for SRTP, RTP [88], SIP [68] and audio I/O [77]. A different VoIP app using the same
libraries should be able to use Truz-Call ’s design. The changes made in the audio
framework would be applicable to any VoIP app.

Reference Design Constraints. The OS Audio API expects an audio payload. The
follow up stages of RTP and SRTP also operate on audio. Given the design returns
references from the TEE, the normal-world OS should not able to deduce the plain text
audio from the reference. The normal-world OS can be allowed to know length of the
audio.

TEE Data Management Constraints. A VoIP call is a two-way call, i.e. it involves
record and playback. The two way flow of audio must happen in parallel. Any
dependency between record and playback will add latency. The design should reduce the
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number of operations in the TEE to reduce latency. Also, the design should reduce the
data size passed into the TEE to reduce latency.

Record and Playback Behavior. RTP protocol in the normal-world app uses
packetization feature to send data. The TEE data management should be able to
accommodate this behavior. Also the RTP protocol uses jitter handling feature to playback
data. The TEE data management should be able to accommodate this behavior.

4.6

TEE Invocation and Data Encoding

Fig. 4.7.: Android Audio Architecture

This section discusses how TEE is leveraged by various stages of the normal-world
VoIP audio pipeline. It also discusses what encoding is used by the TEE to convey the
audio data to the normal-world pipeline. Figure 4.7 shows the architecture of Android’s
audio stack [66]. An Android app can use various Java APIs for Audio I/O, all of which
use the same underlying native framework. This communicates with the underlying
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AudioFlinger service (Android’s sound server [67]). In order to protect the user’s
conversation during a VoIP call, TEE needs to be leveraged to provide the VoIP app the
user’s audio without ever releasing the plain text audio from the secure world. The user’s
audio can only enter the normal world in an encoded form. The question becomes at
which layer in the normal-world stack should TEE be invoked for audio. In Figure 4.7,
Audioflinger (3) is responsible for resampling [90] and mixing audio streams [67], as
well as applying effects. If TEE is used at this layer, we would have to make sure that
there is a path that doesn’t alter the data obtained by or to be given to the TEE, in order not
to break the audio encoding. Using TEE at (4) or (5) will incur the same issue as data will
pass through the AudioFlinger. Layer (1) provides the app with several APIs to read/write
audio. To allow the VoIP app developer to use any API for Audio I/O, the design decision
was to use TEE at layer (2).

4.6.1

Audio Data Encoding

Once the TEE invocation point for the audio framework has been identified, we have
to decide an encoding to provide audio data to the normal world. The data provided to the
native audio framework can be encrypted by the TEE. In this case, the cryptographic
operations done in the app’s SRTP layer will become redundant; the audio data will be
encrypted twice. It will also add latency to the VoIP flow because of the additional time
spent encrypting the audio data again. One way to handle this design option would be to
disable the operations done in the normal world SRTP layer, but this would disable an
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essential stage of the app flow. The goal of Truz-Call is to preserve the relative
structure of the essential layers in the VoIP app, including the SRTP layer.
In order to allow the app to still use the SRTP library for encryption and HMAC, the
design does not provide encrypted data to the native audio framework. When the app
requests audio data, the native audio framework gets a reference for the audio. The
reference is a string with the same length as the requested audio data. The RTP layer
prepares a packet containing audio reference(s) as the payload. When the SRTP layer
needs to encrypt the packet, it invokes the TEE which encrypts the audio data
corresponding to the audio reference(s) in the RTP payload and calculates the HMAC for
the RTP packet. Once the TEE returns the result, the SRTP flow can continue to send the
packet out. On the receiving device the reverse will happen. The SRTP library will invoke
the TEE to get an audio reference corresponding to the RTP encrypted payload, with the
decrypted audio staying in the TEE. When the native audio framework needs to play the
audio, the reference is given to the TEE which plays the corresponding audio. Figure 4.8
shows the TEE invocation points (the RTP layer is omitted).

4.6.2

Independent Audio Pipeline Stages

Given two types of TEE invocations (by the native audio framework and by the SRTP
library), Truz-Call needs to make sure that the TA logic and corresponding data for
these invocations is handled in a way such that there is no bottleneck created in the
normal-world audio pipeline. To handle the two types of TEE invocations, the design
needs to allow sharing of data via a common memory space between the corresponding
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Fig. 4.8.: TEE Invocation by Audio Framework and SRTP

TA logic. The plain text audio in TEE must be accessible to the cryptographic logic when
SRTP library provides it a reference and conversely the audio data decrypted must be
accessible to the TEE audio playback logic when it is provided with a reference by the
native audio framework. When a TA is invoked, it can access three types of memory
including stack, heap and shared memory. Only data in heap and shared memory can
retain its value across multiple TEE invocations. TEE provides two types of shared
memory, namely unsecure shared memory (used by normal world to pass arguments) and
secure shared memory (not visible to normal world, but visible to TEE components). The
two candidates to keep plain text audio in common memory are heap and secure shared
memory. Heap cannot be used for this design because our design constraint demands
reduced latency. In order to use heap as a common memory, the TEE logic corresponding
to different normal-world stages will need to belong to the same TA because the TEE OS
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provides isolated heaps for different TAs. This would require multiple normal-world
pipeline stages to invoke the same TA, which would require the TA to be configured with
TA FLAG MULTI SESSION [52]. This would make the TA invocations serialized i.e.
different normal-world stages won’t be able to call the TA simultaneously (the call from
one stage will have to wait for the call from the other stage to finish). This would create a
performance bottleneck and add latency. Therefore the design uses secure shared memory
to provide common memory for plain text audio in the TEE. OP-TEE provides this feature
via secure data path (SDP) [51]. It allows a secure pool of memory to be allocated in the
TEE with normal world having a reference to this memory. The SDP reference is made
available to the TEE bridges in the normal world. The normal-world bridges pass the
reference when invoking corresponding TAs so that the common memory containing the
plain text audio is accessible in the TA logic.

4.6.3

TEE Bridges and TAs

Figure 4.8 shows three TEE bridges and four TAs inside the TEE. The TEE bridges
are native daemons (running with root privilege) that allow normal world components to
invoke the TAs. The App TEE Bridge allows the SRTP layer (Java code) to invoke
the Record Crypto & Playback Crypto TAs responsible for cryptographic
operations (encryption and HMAC) in the TEE. The Framework TEE Bridge allows
the native audio framework to invoke the Record Data TA responsible for collecting
audio data and providing reference for audio data, and Playback Data TA responsible
for playing out audio data corresponding to the provided references. The Simulation
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TEE Bridge allows the design to record & play audio using a simulation environment
by using a real phone to provide the audio hardware (discussed in Section 4.12).
Truz-Call sends and receives audio references to/from the TEE, which means each
time the normal world needs audio or wants to play audio a TEE invocation will be
needed. Each invocation from the normal world involves opening a session with the TEE
OS. Each TEE invocation session consumes some memory in the TEE OS due to saved
state. At the same time the TEE environment is only assigned a limited amount of
memory [56]. If the normal world keeps opening sessions based on the requirements of an
on-going VoIP call, the TEE OS will exhaust its memory and deny any more TA
invocations which will stop the secure call. Closing a session and opening it again for
each TEE invocation will contribute to latency. To solve this issue we make our TEE
bridges persistent by reusing TEE sessions. A bridge only initiates one TA session (with
each TA that needs to be used) at the beginning of the call. All other TEE invocations via
the bridge reuse the persistent session. This way the VoIP call can use TEE without
exhausting its memory and can go on for any duration.

4.7

VoIP Call Initiation

This section discusses how Truz-Call handles the VoIP call setup. As mentioned in
Section 4.1, the design assumes that the user wants to call a known person as key
exchange is not handled using the TEE. Before a secure call is setup, the caller and callee
need to exchange a secret phrase using a text entry that will be input using a secure UI.
This has been addressed in other works [162, 163, 181, 182]. When the user types in this
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secret phrase, the user also enters the SIP address of the callee. The secret phrase and the
associated SIP address are saved in the TEE trusted storage [34].
The user will initiate the VoIP call using the app’s UI in the normal world. The call
will need to first establish a connection using SIP using a SIP INVITE packet to the
Linphone server. Before sending this packet, Truz-Call invokes a TA and passes the
callee’s SIP address. The user will be shown a confirmation UI asking whether a secure
call should be initiated. Once the user approves, the TA will lookup the secret phrase
associated with the SIP address. Both the SRTP and SRTCP protocols need two sets of
master key and salt (for send and receive directions). The TA concatenates the secret
phrase with a random string generated using the TEE random device. The TA calculates
the master keys and salts by concatenating this new string with four fixed values and
generating SHA-256 hashes. Each master key needs to be 16 byte and master salt needs
to be 14 byte, so each key + salt pair is 30 bytes (first 240 bits of the hash is used). The TA
keeps the master keys and salts in memory. Next the TEE would take control of the audio
peripherals on the device so that normal world cannot access the user’s conversation audio
during the VoIP call (in Truz-Call ’s testing a simulation based environment is used,
but in an actual product TEE will need to control the audio hardware). A secure LED light
(only accessible to the TEE) will be turned on which allows the user to know whether the
audio hardware is under TEE’s control. The TA returns control to the normal world and
returns the random string that was concatenated to the secret phrase. The SIP flow
continues and uses this random string as its CALL-ID [6]. The CALL-ID will be
conveyed to the receiving device when it receives the SIP INVITE so that it can
generate the corresponding master keys and salts. Once SIP has established a connection,
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the app will use the RTP protocol to communicate with the other device on the call. RTP
RFC [8] dictates that the initial value of the sequence number should be random. After
SIP has established a connection, a TA is invoked which generates a random number
using TEE random device. This number is returned to the normal world and is used as the
initial sequence number. Section 4.9 discusses how the TEE checks whether the normal
world has obeyed to use the sequence number given by the TEE.
As shown in Figure 2.10, after an RTP channel is setup, a key exchange needs to take
place to obtain master keys and salts to secure RTP and RTCP. Instead of using protocols
like DTLS [19] and ZRTP [18], the app invokes the TA which has the master keys and
salts in memory. Instead of returning the master keys and salts, the TA returns references
(random strings with same length as key/salt and mapped to these data in the TA memory)
to the normal world. For secure RTP / RTCP channel to be setup the app uses a key
derivation function (KDF). This derives a session encryption key, session HMAC key and a
session salt based on a master key and salt. Truz-Call uses the TA to generate the
session keys and salts, by passing it the references for master keys and salts. Truz-Call
uses the same approach to generate the keys in the TA as the normal world does in the
non-secure case. The keys are generated using AES-CTR. The counter and plain text are
fixed in the app for individual cases of key calculation; only variable involved is the
master key and salt. The KDF passes the counters and plain texts to the TA. The TA returns
references for session keys and salts to secure RTP. The TA returns the sessions keys &
salts to secure RTCP in plain text, because RTCP is not handled in the TEE for the
Truz-Call design as RTCP does not carry audio payload. It should be noted that the
TEE invocation by KDF is only utilized once (at the beginning of call). It does not add any
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latency to user’s conversation once the secure call is setup. Once the session keys and salts
are setup, RTP and RTCP can be secured using SRTP and SRTCP.
So far, this section has covered the call setup flow on the caller’s device. The flow on
the callee device will be similar. When the SIP INVITE is received, before handling it,
a TA is invoked and is passed the caller’s SIP address and the CALL-ID. The control of
the audio hardware will be taken over by the TEE. The TA looks up the secret phrase
corresponding to the SIP address. The TA will calculate the master keys and salts. The
KDF in normal world will invoke the TA in a similar manner to generate session keys and
salts to secure RTP and RTCP.

4.8

TEE Invocation by Audio Framework

Android native framework consists of AudioRecord and AudioTrack, which
contain the functions obtainBuffer() and releaseBuffer(). All Audio I/O
utilizes these functions. Truz-Call invokes TEE in these native framework functions.
This section discusses how these invocations work. In Android’s implementation (AOSP),
these native functions interact with the Audio Flinger, which provides the app process
a buffer to either read data from or write data to. In Truz-Call, the native functions
interact with the TAs to either get audio reference from or send audio reference to the
TEE. The native framework allows reading and writing audio in different modes [42, 43],
including a callback mode using which the audio data is fetched from or provided to a
callback function. Linphone’s native mediastreamer library [77] uses the callback
mechanism for audio I/O. The native framework runs native threads
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(AudioRecordThread and AudioTrack Thread) which use obtainBuffer(),
the callback and releaseBuffer() in a while loop (Figure 4.9). The
threadloop() function containing this while loop is executed periodically based
native Thread class [28, 50].

Fig. 4.9.: Use of TEE in Native AudioRecord

4.8.1

TEE Invocation by AudioRecord

VoIP apps using RTP buffer audio data before sending it out (packetization [98]). In
case of Linphone, 640 bytes is buffered. In AOSP’s implementation, to construct 640
bytes of audio data, at the call initiation the app instructs the audio framework that it
should be notified each time 640 bytes of audio data is available. As the call progresses,
the AudioRecordThread attempts to get the requested amount of audio from the
AudioFlinger via obtainBuffer(). If enough audio data is not available, the
framework notifies the app with the available amount via the callback and makes up for
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the remainder by continuing the loop. Truz-Call emulates this behavior as the
AudioRecordThread uses obtainBuffer() to allocate a buffer and ask the
Record Data TA for a reference based on the size requested by the app. If the
requested amount of audio data is not available, the Record Data TA returns a
reference of the same length as the available amount. The AudioRecordThread sends
the reference to the mediastreamer library via a callback. The releaseBuffer()
call frees the buffer. The AudioRecordThread makes up for the remainder by
continuing the loop.

4.8.2

TEE Invocation by AudioTrack

VoIP apps using RTP use a jitter buffer. The RTP library [88] uses this buffer to hold
packets as they arrive because of the possible variable delay involved. This allows the
packets to be played in sequence. When the call is in progress, the amount of audio played
by the app varies based on how much data the app wants to make available. When using
Android’s AOSP implementation, at call initiation the app instructs the native audio
framework to request a certain number of bytes from the app during the call. The
AudioTrackThread is constrained by the amount of audio data the AudioFlinger
can take based on the obtainBuffer() call. The AudioTrackThread requests the
app based on the buffer size available from AudioFlinger. The app responds with a
size equal to the minimum of size asked and size available. The AudioTrackThread
sends the audio data to AudioFlinger using releaseBuffer(). The
AudioTrackThread handles the remainder by continuing the loop. Truz-Call ’s
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design emulates this behavior. Initially AudioTrackThread requests the app based on
the configured size via the callback. The callback gets the audio reference from
mediastreamer. The reference received from the app is sent to the Playback Data
TA in releaseBuffer(). The TA responds with the available size in TEE. If there is a
remainder from the configured size (set at call initiation), then the loop is continued, and
the AudioTrackThread requests a size from the app based on the buffer size available
in the TEE.

4.9

TEE Invocation by SRTP

This section discusses how SRTP leverages the TEE for encryption and HMAC. The
SRTP library does replay detection [10], which is not moved into the TEE in
Truz-Call. The SRTP library in Linphone uses AES-CTR for encryption using 128 bit
keys and uses SHA-128 when calculating HMAC. For AES-CTR, the SRTP library
calculates the counter from four values: packet index, SSRC, salt and a block counter
[29]. Packet index is a combination of the sequence number and a rollover counter (counts
sequence number rollover of 65535). Packet index is distinct for each packet. The salt is
calculated at the beginning of the call and is kept in the TEE. SSRC is an identifier for a
source of RTP packets involved in a VoIP call and is given to TEE at the beginning of the
call. The block counter increments from zero for each packet. As mentioned in
Section 4.8, the native audio framework provides audio references to the app based on the
size of available audio. This results in the RTP packet eventually constructed in the app
consisting of a set of references in the payload. For each RTP packet, the SRTP layer
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sends the entire packet and session encryption & HMAC key references to the Record
Crypto TA. The TA calculates the counter for AES-CTR using the sequence number in
the RTP header. For the first packet the TA compares the sequence number against the
initial sequence number to ensure that the normal world is using the sequence number
specified by the TEE. For subsequent packets the sequence number is expected to
increment by one each time and the TA verifies this (in case of rollover the TA verifies that
the packet index is increasing). The TA encrypts the audio data corresponding to the set of
references in the RTP payload (further discussed in Section 4.10). Once the encrypted
payload is in place in the packet, the TA computes the HMAC and returns the result to the
normal world. The SRTP library can then continue with sending the packet out. On the
receiver device, the reverse steps happen. The Playback Crypto TA is given the
received packet. The TA verifies the HMAC. If the verification fails, the TA informs the
normal world. Otherwise, the TA calculates the counter from the sequence number and
SSRC in the packet, the salt (from call setup) and the block counter. The TA decrypts the
payload, replaces it with a reference and returns the result to the normal world. The SRTP
layer forwards the packet containing the reference to the RTP handling layer to continue
playback.

4.10

Reference Data Management

This section explains how Truz-Call manages the plain text audio data in the TEE
memory, and how it translates references to audio data or generates references for audio
data. To manage audio data in the TEE, ring buffers are utilized similar to the normal
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world. Android follows the standard practice of using FIFO buffers to manage audio data.
This is done in the AudioFlinger [41] and in Linux’s ALSA driver [35]. Truz-Call
uses two ring buffers inside TEE’s SDP memory, one for record data and other for
playback data.

4.10.1

Data Management for Record

Fig. 4.10.: Reference Data Management for Record

RTP in normal world uses packetization. The VoIP app buffers a certain number of
bytes before constructing an RTP packet. The native audio framework may send multiple
requests to the TEE to provide the required number of bytes to the app. Truz-Call
matches VoIP packetization behavior in the TEE. As shown in Figure 4.10, each time the
native audio framework requests a certain number of bytes, the Record Data TA
moves the requested (or available) number of bytes from the ring buffer to a separate
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cache in the SDP memory. The data in the ring buffer is provided by the Simulation
TEE Bridge which gets it from the simulation hardware setup. The cache is necessary
because by the time the SRTP layer invokes TEE, the data corresponding to the
reference(s) may have been overwritten in the ring buffer (the overwriting behavior is
similar to how audio drivers in Linux buffer data [9]). The TEE needs to give the audio
framework a reference corresponding to the audio data moved into the cache. As
discussed in Section 4.9, when the SRTP library invokes the Record Crypto TA, it
needs to encrypt the RTP payload, for which it needs a buffer containing all the audio data
corresponding to the set of references.
One of the design constraints of TruzCall is to reduce latency. A simple
implementation would be to lookup the audio data corresponding to each reference,
assemble the buffer and then proceed to encryption and HMAC. This would add latency
because of the time spent in the TEE to assemble the buffer before actually starting the
encryption (data corresponding to each reference would require two memcpy()
operations). In order to reduce latency an approach is needed that uses less time in the
TEE to prepare the buffer to be encrypted. When the SRTP library invokes the TEE, the
buffer corresponding to the RTP payload should already be setup ready to be used. To
achieve this, the cache in the SDP memory is organized holding plain text audio in
multiples of packetization buffer size (configurable at call initiation). Whenever the native
audio framework asks the TEE for audio data, before returning a reference the
corresponding (or available) bytes of audio are copied into the cache. The cache is always
preparing the next buffer for RTP. Since the reference to be returned by TEE is supposed
to be the same length as requested (or available) number of bytes, the TA returns a string
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which is generated by using memset() and repeating the index in the cache (e.g. in
Figure 4.10, string returned is 0x01..0x01). This string is the reference for the normal
world. When the SRTP library invokes TEE, the first byte in the RTP payload is the index
in the cache for the next buffer to be encrypted (reduction in data sent to the TEE from
640 bytes to 1 byte reduces latency). This approach results in one memcpy() needed for
data per reference. The difference between two vs one memcpy() may appear
insignificant, but it should be noted that TEE invocation happens several times per second
during a call, and all that latency adds up to affect voice quality.

4.10.2

Data Management for Playback

RTP in the normal world does jitter handling using a jitter buffer [76]. Out-of-order
delivery and/or delay variation in RTP causes jitter [23]. As RTP data is decrypted in the
TEE, a cache is required to hold decrypted data until the app plays it via audio API.
Truz-Call matches VoIP jitter buffer behavior in the TEE. It allows playing of received
audio after being reordered by the normal world (in case of out-of-order RTP packets).
Individual tracking is done for amount of played audio in the TEE for each decrypted RTP
payload.
Similar to how a cache is maintained to prepare RTP payload for encryption, a
separate cache is used in the SDP memory to keep the playback RTP payload decrypted in
the TEE. As shown in Figure 4.11, when the SRTP library receives a packet from the
network, it forwards it to the Playback Crypto TA for HMAC verification and
decryption. Once decrypted the buffer is added to the next index in the cache. The
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Fig. 4.11.: Reference Data Management for Playback

reference returned to the SRTP library is of the same length as the RTP payload, and is
assigned the cache index value (using memset()). When the native audio framework
requests playback data from the app, the size can vary (discussed in Section 4.8). As the
Playback Data TA gets requests to play audio, it copies data from the cache index
into the playback ring buffer and keeps track of how much data has been played from the
index. Cache index used to play audio is specified by the passed reference. Figure 4.11
shows a case when 5 RTP packets are received in the normal world, but they are out of
order, with correct order requiring audio for packet 4 to be played first, followed by packet
2. The figure shows the state when 600 bytes have been played from packet 4, and the
playback request spans audio data from two indexes 0x04 and 0x02 (the passed
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reference string had 0x04 40 times and 0x02 460 times). The data in the playback ring
buffer is played out by the Simulation TEE Bridge.
A question that can be asked is why can’t one just make the ring buffers large enough
so that enough data is always available for record or enough space is available for
playback ? TEE environments operate with limited amount of memory. In a production
environment, severals TAs can be present in the TEE for various use cases, which can
reduce the amount of memory available. In addition, the amount of audio data available in
TEE at any time depends on the type of audio hardware and the type of interface used.
Also, 640 bytes is used to organize the cache based on the packet size used by Linphone.
A different VoIP app may ask more or less bytes per packet. The goal of Truz-Call ’s
design is to be generic such that it can help reduce latency in different scenarios for VoIP.

4.11

Security Analysis

This section discusses the security analysis of the Truz-Call design. It is assumed
that side channel attacks, covert channel attacks, hardware related attacks and attacks
related to VoIP network are out of scope. The analysis assumes that the TrustZone
hardware platform is trusted and the secure boot process has initialized the
integrity-verified OP-TEE OS. The goal of the malicious normal-world OS is to obtain the
plain text audio for a VoIP call. The OS can attempt to do this at various phases of the
VoIP call. In each phase, the described scenarios won’t work because of the various
properties of the design. The OS may try to obtain the secret phrase typed by the user.
During the secret phrase entry, TEE controls the UI and input, and user is informed of this
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using a secure LED. This has been discussed in existing work [162, 163, 181, 182]. The
OS may try to fool the user that the secure call is initiated, but not give control to the TEE
and mimic the secure UI for call initiation as shown by the TEE. The OS will not be able
to access the secure LED, which is used to inform the user whether the audio peripherals
are indeed in control of the TEE. Due to this, the OS cannot fool the user regarding secure
call initiation. The OS may try to obtain the master key. The OS won’t know the master
key calculated during call initiation as the secret phrase used for its calculation is
protected and the TEE gives the normal world only a reference to the master key. The
encryption and decryption for SRTP in the TEE uses AES-CTR, which is a stream cipher
and can be subjected to various attacks [173], including keystream reuse, bit-flipping and
chosen-IV attacks. The normal-world OS can influence the counter because the sequence
number is sent by the normal world. If the same key and counter are used, the XOR of
cipher text can give XOR of plain text. In Truz-Call, the counter is not allowed to be
repeated. As mentioned in Section 4.9, the counter calculated in TEE is derived from
packet index, which is derived from sequence number and rollover counter. The TA
verifies that the packet index is increasing each time. Bit-flipping requires knowledge of
part of the plain text. The normal-world OS does not have access to the plain text audio.
Chosen-IV attack relies on choosing certain IVs and analyzing the generated keystreams.
The normal-world OS cannot observe the keystream as it resides in TEE memory.
As mentioned in Section 4.9, the SRTP library does replay detection. It does this
based on packet index and uses a replay list & window to detect replay attacks. This
functionality is not moved into the TEE. The normal-world OS may attempt to replay
received packets. This is countered as the TA checks to ensure that the packet index
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handled is always increasing. The normal-world OS can attempt to replay voice payload
for outgoing packets by holding onto references seen before. The size of the audio cache
in the SDP memory provides a brief time gap before same index is used again due to index
roll over. The TA zeros out the memory once the data at a certain index has been used.
Reuse of an older index won’t result in re-sending of data.

4.12

Simulation Test Environment

This section discusses the simulation based approach used for building the hardware
environment for testing Truz-Call. This is the first time a simulation based approach
has been applied to the area of TEE research. Similar approach is used in other areas like
embedded system testing where it is referred to as hardware-in-the-loop simulation [12].
In TEE research one often needs to interface hardware peripherals with the TEE OS. This
task can be challenging for non-hardware experts, depending on the available support
from the TEE OS vendor. In the Truz-Call prototype, the Hikey 620 development
board [72] is used. The OP-TEE OS provides different driver support [86] for different
boards, and for the Hikey it provides UART and SPI drivers. Common audio
hardware [60] used in prototyping rely on I2S for which no driver is provided by
OP-TEE. Given the lack of support from the vendor and the community, with limited
resources it would not be efficient to develop a board specific driver stack to make I2S
work on Hikey. The board has USB interface available, but using it with TEE would
require introducing the USB stack in the TEE OS. UART could be used to get audio into
TEE, but it would require audio compression techniques like DPCM [171] and
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ADPCM [170] with sample rate limited by the UART bandwidth. SPI could be used for
audio, but it presents its own challenges including data buffering, full bus utilization,
unnecessary conversion/overhead, and fine-grained clock speed control [58]. To build a
hardware test environment to demonstrate Truz-Call, an approach needs to be used
that does not depend on the available support from the vendor, and can best retain the
quality of data needed for the experiment. To meet this requirement, a simulation based
testing environment is introduced, in which a real phone is used to provide the audio
hardware. The audio data from the phone is streamed to the TA in the TEE OS via the
Simulation TEE bridge. The bridge is considered part of the secure world.

Fig. 4.12.: Simulation Setup

To setup the environment (Figure 4.12), a Nexus 5X phone is used with each of two
Hikey 620 development boards (two ends of VoIP call during evaluation). Both Hikeys
run Android OS version 7.1.2 in the normal world and OP-TEE OS version 2.5 in the

91
secure world. The Hikeys use USB ethernet adapters for internet access. Both Hikeys are
connected to the same switch and can reach the internet via a connected router. The
internet access is needed because the VoIP app needs to connect to its server for call
initiation. The open source Linphone app [5] is used for testing (version v3.3.2).
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 showed how the Simulation TEE bridge provides data for
record and gets data for playback. The bridge communicates with an Android app on the
Nexus phone over TCP to send / receive audio data. The combination of the bridge and the
external phone replaces the need for drivers inside the TEE OS for audio hardware access
by the TAs. The simulation bridge does send/receive plain text audio between the external
phone and the TEE Data TAs, but this component is used for easier prototyping. If a
vendor adopted Truz-Call, the simulation bridge would no longer be needed as TAs
would directly use audio drivers provided by the vendor in the TEE. In that case user’s
conversation plain text audio would never be returned to the normal world. The app on the
Nexus phone records and plays audio in 16-bit PCM format (mono) at a sample rate of 16
KHz. The app continuously sends recorded audio to the bridge which makes it available to
the ring buffer for record data in the TEE. The bridge periodically gets available audio in
the TEE playback ring buffer and sends it to the app for playback on the phone. Although
the simulation environment provides the benefit of making hardware setup easier for
prototyping, it does add latency because of the time taken to send/receive audio data
to/from the external phone. A video demo of the simulation setup can be found at [141].
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4.13

Evaluation

This section discusses the evaluation done for Truz-Call using the Linphone app
and the simulation test environment. From the point a call is established Truz-Call
uses existing VoIP protocols. Any additional delay added is on the end device. The design
doesn’t change the delay on the network. The evaluation focuses on measuring
modifications for secure VoIP on the end device. Network delay can vary as it does in
everyday usage of VoIP. Since both Hikey boards act as sender and receiver during a VoIP
call, metrics reported were collected on one of the devices. The reported metrics are based
on three VoIP app configurations: (1) C-Off, (2) C-On and (3) Secure. In the first two
cases, the VoIP app does not use Truz-Call, but the additional audio computation
stages are turned off vs on respectively. In the third case, the VoIP app uses Truz-Call
and the additional stages are turned off. Comparing the non-secure cases with USB audio
(hardware attached to normal world) against secure case with simulation setup would be
unfair because the simulation would add some latency. In all cases, the simulation
environment was used for audio data. In the non-secure cases, audio data obtained by the
Simulation Bridge is passed directly to the native audio framework.
For the test cases C-off and Secure, the additional audio computations in the Linphone
app are disabled. In case of the computations resampling and compression, simply
disabling them breaks the flow of the app because how it is engineered. So the code of
these two stages was modified so that the reference audio data is not modified. Linphone
downsamples 48KHz to 16KHz (reverse on receiving), so the configuration of the app was
changed s.t. it directly asks for 16 KHz, in which case downsampling is not needed. In
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case of compression, the data is directly copied over to the target buffer instead of actually
compressing. With these changes, the app needs 16-bit PCM audio data, and the
simulation test environment is configured to read / write 16-bit audio.

4.13.1

Performance

This section compares the impact of Truz-Call on the time taken during a VoIP
call. Truz-Call impacts the amount of time the app uses between getting audio data
and sending out a packet (and vice versa for received audio). The time taken in the SRTP
layer is reported as that involves the use of TEE in the secure case. Once a call is
established, the time taken for a spoken word to be heard at the other end of the call will
change when Truz-Call is used (end-to-end time). The time it takes the app to get
audio data for record or send audio data for playback using our simulation setup is also
reported. The evaluation focuses here on the time taken between native audio framework
and the Simulation Bridge (the time taken by the daemon to send/receive audio
data to/from the external phone over the network is excluded). The reported results are the
average from 20 measurements. The overhead added in SRTP is 0.48 ms for outgoing
packets and 0.54 ms for incoming packets. This has little impact on overall performance
as Truz-Call adds a quarter second average overhead compared to C-off for end-to-end
time during a call. The end-to-end time for C-on is higher because it uses additional
computation stages in the VoIP pipeline, which are not used by the secure case.
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Table 4.1: Truz-Call Performance Evaluation
SRTP Time per Outgoing packet (ms)
SRTP Time per Incoming packet (ms)
End-to-End Time (seconds)
Audio Input Time (ms / KB)
Audio Output Time (ms / KB)

4.13.2

Non-Secure
0.16
0.12
C-off: 4.27
C-on: 5.6
16.95
14.31

Secure
0.64
0.66
4.51
18.45
32.96

VoIP Quality

VoIP call quality can be affected by several factors [23, 79, 98], including packet loss,
voice quality, delay and delay variation (jitter). For VoIP, 1-2.5% of packet loss is
considered acceptable [172]. The evaluation includes measurements for 2% packet loss in
the test for voice quality. To test packet loss, the evaluation uses the Linux iptables
tool. Mean opinion score (MOS) is a well-known measure of voice quality [80]. It is a
subjective test wherein participants judge the quality of a voice transmission system by
rating the voice quality on a scale of 1 to 5. The evaluation used Amazon Mechanical
Turk [81] to gather the data from 60 participants (US-based). The audio recordings from
calls using non-secure (C-on) and secure cases were provided. The recordings were audio
data received on one of the Nexus phones in the simulation setup. The participants were
also asked to answer a question based on each recording to check if they understand the
content and to ensure survey quality. The survey and the recordings can be found
at [83, 84, 92, 93, 97]. The MOS scores and percentage of participants that answered the
questions correctly are reported. The MOS scores were expected to be low because of the
additional latency from the simulation setup. MOS scores provide user perceived quality
difference between the non-secure and secure cases. The participants were able to
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comprehend the contents of the secure call at least 81% of the time. This result would be
better if an audio driver was available in the TEE, as simulation makes prototyping easier
but adds latency during testing.
Table 4.2: Truz-Call VoIP Quality Evaluation
MOS (no packet loss)
MOS (2% packet loss)
Correct Answer (no loss)
Correct Answer (2% loss)
C-off
JBM (ms)
55
IAJ (average)
26.41
IAJ (median)
26.5
JB (ms)
67.5

C-on
2.1
2.0
95%
98%
C-on
211
27.38
27.3
89.06

Secure
1.3
1.2
95%
81%
Secure
207
26.12
26.6
79.26

There are several types of delay [11, 98] involved in VoIP. In Truz-Call ’s
evaluation, the relevant delays include processing delay and packetization delay.
Processing delay relates to the audio codec algorithm which is used for compression.
Since the additional audio computation stages were disabled in the secure case, the delay
incurred for this stage was not measured. The packetization delay relates to the buffering
of audio by the RTP library before sending out a packet. Truz-Call does not change
the amount of audio buffered for each packet. The evaluation measures the time taken to
prepare each RTP packet before it is handed off to the SRTP layer. The average time taken
for each case was as follows: (1) C-On: 19.98 ms, (2) C-off: 18.08 ms, (3) Secure: 21.23
ms. During a VoIP call, RTP packets may arrive out of sequence and/or at varying
intervals [23, 57, 73]. VoIP apps like Linphone use a jitter buffer [76] to hold incoming
packets before the corresponding audio is played out, which adds some delay. Since
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Truz-Call uses TEE at different layers of the VoIP stack, TEE invocations can add
timing irregularity and contribute to jitter. Three metrics related to jitter are reported: (1)
JBM: maximum jitter buffer delay obtained from RTCP XR [7], (2) IAJ: inter-arrival
jitter obtained from RTCP SR [8], (3) JB: jitter buffer size. Metric (1) is the maximum
delay applied to received packets by the jitter buffer. Metric (2) is mean deviation of the
difference in packet spacing at the receiver compared to the sender for a pair of packets
(the average and median are reported). For metric (3), the average value is reported. The
values correspond to a 15 minute call. The secure case adds average 1.25 ms overhead in
RTP packet construction, but adds less jitter compared to C-on, due to less number of
stages in the VoIP pipeline. When compared to equal number of pipeline stages in C-off,
secure case does add jitter overhead, but still results in a quarter second average
end-to-end time overhead.

4.14

Publication

The Truz-Call design has been published in 2020 in the paper titled TruzCall:
Secure VoIP Calling on Android using ARM TrustZone [150]. The dissertation author was
the first author in this paper publication.

97

5. TRUZ-SIM: HARDWARE SIMULATION TO ASSIST
TRUSTZONE RESEARCH
5.1

Problem Overview

In TEE research one often needs to interface different types of hardware peripherals
with the TEE OS. This task can be challenging for non-hardware experts, depending on
the available driver support from the TEE OS vendor. In this chapter, the TEE OS in focus
will be OP-TEE, given its wide adoption [154, 157, 159, 160, 167, 184, 185] in research.
The TEE board in focus will be Hikey (as discussed in Section 2.2).

Fig. 5.1.: Access Hardware in Normal vs Secure Case

Referring Figure 5.1, in normal case an Android app requests hardware related data
(e.g. GPS location) from the Android framework, which fetches it from hardware attached
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to the normal world via drivers in the Android kernel. To maintain transparency, in secure
case an Android app will still use existing APIs, but will require data to be fetched from
the TEE via the existing Android framework. The data obtained will vary based on the use
case. It could be attested raw data obtained via the TEE. It can also be reference to raw
data saved in the TEE memory. Currently there is no usable driver in the TEE kernel to
allow a TA to read data from different types of hardware like GPS and camera.

Fig. 5.2.: Existing Driver Support in TEE Kernel

The OP-TEE OS vendor provides UART and SPI drivers for Hikey. There are several
issues a researcher can face when trying to interface hardware with the TEE OS.

1. Interfacing hardware with UART / SPI interface: If the researcher wants to use
existing drivers (like UART and SPI), he/she must write a driver stack on top of
those existing drivers. The researcher will have to spend considerable amount of
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time to investigate the protocol of the specific hardware to be interfaced. Example
for this can be the JPEG camera [74] (manual [75]).
2. Interfacing hardware with I2C / CSI / I2S interface: Since the TEE OS does
not provide a driver for these interfaces, the researcher cannot attach the
corresponding hardware and interact using the mentioned protocols. Example of
such hardware can include CSI based camera [113], audio peripherals [60] and
sensors (e.g. accelerometer [127]). For interfaces like I2C, one can use a bridge
(example [146]) to connect with UART. In order to use a bridge hardware setup,
some hardware experience would be needed and could be challenging for
non-hardware experts.
3. Limited pins for multiple attachments: The Hikey board provides two UART ports
and one SPI port on its low speed expansion header. One UART port is usually used
for console. In the case where the researcher wants to attach multiple devices to
UART, techniques like multiplexing [13] will need to be used, which would require
hardware experience.

The researcher cannot write a custom driver stack for each hardware vendor, and
cannot write interface specific driver layer into the TEE. Due to the previously listed
challenges, there is a need for a TEE prototyping environment that can allow researchers
to interface different category of hardware from different vendors with the TEE OS
irrespective of the available driver support. The design should provide trusted applications
with quality of data that matches a real phone. The design should also require reduced
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setup time and no hardware experience. The goal is to provide a design that can encourage
independent researchers to prototype their ideas based on TEE.

5.2

Related Work

There are several works that provide hardware access across the same OS. Most of
these works have been done on the Android OS, allowing apps on one Android device to
access hardware on a second Android device. Rio [152] provides I/O sharing between
mobile devices by splitting the I/O stack at the device file boundary. Semantics-Aware
Design for Mounting Remote Sensors on Mobile Systems [158] builds a remote sensor
I/O stack that is efficient in terms of communication energy and time costs.
Interconnecting Heterogeneous Devices in the Personal Mobile Cloud [164] builds a
resource sharing framework as a middleware in the mobile OS. Mobile Plus [166] allows
Android applications to utilize system functionalities across devices by extending
Android’s binder inter-process communication (IPC) mechanism. Heterogeneous
Multi-Mobile Computing [151] allows mobile apps to share and combine multiple devices
by redirecting and transforming heterogeneous device input and output across mobile
devices. It uses a data-centric approach by importing and exporting data to and from each
mobile system using common cross-platform device data formats.
TrustUI [162] uses a split device driver architecture to allow a TA in the TEE to use
hardware using normal-world drivers. The work is funded by a vendor and likely has
vendor driver support in the TEE. For example, the TA in this work can operate on a
framebuffer for display, which would require a framebuffer driver [21, 175]. Also the
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approach is not viable for peripherals like GPS sensor and camera as the normal world
will be able to tamper with raw data being given to the secure world. There is no existing
work that solves the problem for TEE to provide TAs transparent hardware access for
different category of hardware, under the constraint that the researcher does not have the
relevant drivers for hardware access in the TEE kernel.

5.3

Main Idea

Since there isn’t sufficient driver support in the TEE OS, the design would need to
leverage drivers outside the TEE to interface with the hardware. The idea involves
creating a driver in the TEE OS that uses a cross-OS binding with a driver in a different
OS to allow the trusted application in the TEE to transparently access hardware attached
to the second OS.

Fig. 5.3.: Cross-OS Binding for Hardware Access
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To maintain transparency, in secure case an Android app will still use existing APIs of
the Android framework. The TEE integration with the Android framework will invoke a
TA inside the secure world. The TA needs to be fetch hardware data. Depending on the
use case, TA could attest it to return to the normal world, or save it in TEE memory and
return a reference to the normal world. The TA will utilize a thin driver layer added in the
TEE kernel to access hardware. The driver leveraged by the TA inside the TEE will be
referred to as simulation driver. A simulation in general is a system that exhibits the
behavior of and performs functions of a real-world entity. In Truz-Sim, the design is
trying to provide behavior / function of hardware attached to the TEE by leveraging
hardware attached to the second OS and using corresponding drivers.
There are two aspects that need to be addressed: (1) How to interface the TEE with the
second OS via cross-OS binding ? (2) How to transparently use devices from another OS
? Section 5.4 discusses interfacing between the TEE and the second OS. Transparency is
discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5.1.

5.4

Design

As mentioned in Section 5.3, the design needs to utilize drivers outside the TEE to
interface with hardware. In Truz-Sim, Raspberry Pi is used to provide the second OS,
as it has rich community support to attach a variety of hardware. Figure 5.4 shows three
options for cross-OS binding:
1. Bind with USB driver in the normal-world OS to interact with hardware attached to
the normal world.
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2. Bind with driver in Raspberry Pi OS via UART / SPI driver in the TEE OS.
3. Bind with driver in Raspberry Pi OS via network driver in normal-world OS.

Fig. 5.4.: Cross-OS Binding Options

UART and SPI for Interfacing with Hikey. In Figure 5.4, the use of UART and SPI
has been crossed out. The Hikey board has two UART ports on its low speed expansion
connector. One UART is used for console. The other UART was observed as disabled in
the Android + OP-TEE branch used for testing (this may change in the future). In order to
use SPI, devices would need to communicate in a master/slave relationship [39], using
the Pi board as a slave and the Hikey board as a master. There is no working demo to
make SPI slave work on the Raspberry Pi in the community [33, 94, 95]. In addition to
these, using UART / SPI also comes with the challenge discussed in Section 5.1.

Selecting Cross-OS Binding Option. Given the options shown in Figure 5.4, one or
more options need to be selected for the design. In addition to the constraints mentioned
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in Section 5.1, there is also a security constraint which requires the cross-OS binding
option to provide the same security guarantee as the real TEE driver path. Under the
option selected, the normal-world OS should not be able to read data from the hardware.
For hardware attached to the normal-world, the security constraint cannot be guaranteed.
The option selected is to access hardware attached to Raspberry Pi via normal-world
network driver, as the path can provide required security properties. For prototyping
purposes, researchers can encrypt the data passed betweent the TEE and the Pi board.

Fig. 5.5.: High Level Design

5.4.1

High Level Design

Based on selected cross-OS binding option, the high level design is shown in
Figure 5.5. The TA will use a simulation API to invoke a thin simulation driver layer
added in the TEE kernel to access hardware. The simulation driver will provide the TA a
cross-OS binding with the required driver in the Raspberry Pi OS, allowing the TA to read

105
data from hardware attached to the Raspberry Pi board. The data will be transparently
returned to the Android app via TEE integration. The simulation driver will provide a
cross-OS binding with drivers in the Raspberry Pi OS using the RPC channel via the
normal-world network driver. In the existing OP-TEE OS, RPC is used in situations when
a TEE thread needs to call some service from the normal world. In such case, the TEE
saves the TEE execution state in its executing thread and invokes the normal world. When
the normal world returns to the TEE, it resumes its thread execution. There are two main
RPC services invoked by the TEE: (1) forwarding of a non-secure interrupt, and (2)
invocation of a normal-world service (allocate shared memory, access normal-world
filesystem, etc.).
The simulation design allows both normal world and secure world to get data from the
Raspberry Pi OS. The normal-world Android framework can get data from the Raspberry
Pi OS via the normal-world network driver and provide it transparently to the Android
app. This data will be received in plain text. To simulate the real scenario, the researcher
can hard code a symmetric key in the TEE and the Pi board to encrypt the data passed
between the TEE and the Pi board to prevent the normal world from reading the data.

Hardware Support. Truz-Sim will be designed to allow testing of TEE based
research ideas on mobile devices. A reference diagram of a modern mobile architecture
can be found at [130]. There are various peripherals used with recent mobile devices
including UI, sensors, audio, camera, bluetooth etc. In the project Truz-Call, an early
version of simulation has been used to get audio data using external drivers. In the
Truz-Sim project, the hardware covered includes GPS sensor, camera and UI.
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Use Cases. There are several possible use cases for Truz-Sim. It can be used in
scenarios where the TA needs to gets raw data from hardware, save it in TEE memory and
return a reference to the normal world. This can be useful to address use cases as those
discussed in chapters 3 and 4. It can also be useful in cases where TA needs to return
attested raw data to the normal world. The use case of attestation will be used to explain
the design for camera and GPS access in the next section. It should be noted that the
attestation use cases as problems have been identified by a different PhD student 1 .
Truz-Sim is providing the design to facilitate the testing of these use cases.

5.4.2

Camera Access Design

The camera access use case (Figure 5.6) involves both normal world and secure world
needing data from the Pi board. The user takes a picture via a camera app in two steps.
First the user needs to request a camera preview to allow the user to position the object in
front of the camera. During this step, the camera needs to get live images from the camera
hardware. The camera app requests preview via the camera library. In order to maintain
transparency, the app will use existing APIs in secure case. The camera library would use
the normal-world network driver to get the camera feed (series of camera pictures) from
the driver in the Raspberry Pi OS. Once the object is in the right position, the user will
click the camera button to take the picture. The camera app will request the picture via the
camera library. The camera library will utilize TEE integration to send the request to the
TA in the secure world. The TA will utilize the simulation API to request a camera picture.
The simulation driver in the TEE kernel will use the cross-OS binding to forward the
1

Ammar Salman (assalman@syr.edu)
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request to the driver in the Raspberry Pi OS to get the camera picture. In order to show the
entire flow works, in Truz-Sim the TA returns the obtained camera picture data to the
normal world where it is transparently returned to the app via TEE integration with the
camera framework. A complete test by a researcher would involve the TA also returning
an attestation for the camera picture to the normal-world app, which could eventually be
sent to the server.

Fig. 5.6.: Camera Access Design

5.4.3

GPS Access Design

The GPS access use case (Figure 5.7) involves only the secure world needing data
from the Pi board. An Android app gets a GPS location (latitude and longitude) via the
Android framework’s LocationManagerService. In the secure case, for
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transparency reasons the app will use the existing API. The location service will get the
location via TEE integration by invoking a TA, which will use the simulation API to
request a GPS location. The simulation driver in the TEE kernel will use the cross-OS
binding to forward the request to the driver in the Raspberry Pi OS to get the next GPS
sentence. If the received GPS sentence does not contain latitude / longitude information,
then the TA will try again until a GPS sentence with latitude / longitude information is
obtained. In order to show the entire flow works, in Truz-Sim testing the TA returns the
GPS data to the normal world where it is transparently returned to the app via TEE
integration with the Android location framework. A complete test by a researcher would
involve the TA also returning an attestation for the GPS data to the normal-world app,
which could eventually be sent to the server.

Fig. 5.7.: GPS Access Design
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5.5

Implementation

This section provides implementation details for TEE library support for simulation,
simulation driver, and details of camera and GPS access design.

5.5.1

Trusted App APIs for Hardware Access

The TA accesses hardware via APIs provided by a library in the TEE. In a real world
scenario, the TA will use APIs specified by Global Platform [119] (abbreviated as GP).
The TA API categories set by GP include Peripheral API and Event API [59]. In order to
be transparent in case of simulation, it is important that the TA uses either the same API or
an API with compatible behavior as GP APIs. OP-TEE does not provide GP APIs in the
TEE library. In order to demonstrate that Truz-Sim can be compliant with GP, the
design customizes the existing TEE library (libutee) to provide a simulation API that
has compatible behavior with GP APIs. The GP APIs are not ported into OP-TEE.
It is also important that when a TA accesses hardware via the simulation API, it is not
aware of where the data is coming from or the type of interface being used. The
simulation is currently accessing data via the normal world using an external Pi board, but
in the future researchers may extend it to use local interfaces inside the TEE (to access Pi
or other external board) depending on the interface support at the time. When using
simulation, the TA should only worry about the category of device being used (e.g. GPS,
camera etc.).
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GlobalPlatform Peripheral and Event APIs. Reading using peripheral API [59,
Section 9.7.8] allows a TA to implement polled communication with a peripheral. The TA
does not wait on any hardware signal and can use the API to retrieve the data available at
the time of calling. The TA allocates a buffer of bufSize bytes before reading using
peripheral API. On return, this will contain as much data as is available from the
peripheral, up to the limit of bufSize. The bufSize parameter will be updated with the
actual number of bytes placed into the buffer. The TA can use the peripheral API to write
a buffer of certain size to the peripheral [59, Section 9.7.10].
The event API [59, Section 9.8] supports an event loop that enables a TA to process
messages from peripherals. The event loop is useful in scenarios where peripheral
interaction occurs asynchronously. This API is based on use of an event queue. A TA can
call the event API to check if there are any events available. A TA can get multiple events
at a time. The TA can specify the maximum number of events to be returned. The TA can
also specify a timeout, so that a TA with multiple responsibilities can address them
periodically without needing to use multi-threading. Events submitted to the event queue
for a given peripheral are submitted in the order in which they occur. As Truz-Sim does
not port the GP APIs into OP-TEE, this behavior is demonstrated by having a simulation
API that can allow a TA to interact with peripherals using both polling and event queues.
The hardware scope of Truz-Sim testing includes GPS, camera and UI (touch input).
Peripheral API behavior is demonstrated in case of the GPS sensor, and the event API
behavior is demonstrated in case of Camera and UI (touch input).
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5.5.2

Simulation Driver

In order for the TA to use the simulation driver in TEE to interact with drivers on the
Pi board (to leverage hardware attached to Pi), a cross-OS binding is needed. This binding
is shown in Figure 5.8. The TA invokes the simulation driver via the modified userspace
library libutee and a new system call added to the OP-TEE OS kernel. The simulation
driver sends the request via the normal world using a RPC call [87]. This allows the
request to reach the normal world daemon called tee-supplicant [136]. The daemon
forwards the request using a TCP connection (via normal world network driver) to a
Python program running on the Raspberry Pi board. The Python program can use
available libraries to interact with hardware via drivers in the kernel.

Fig. 5.8.: Use of RPC by Simulation Driver

Using RPC Call. A contiguous buffer will be utilized when sending arguments using
the RPC channel across to the normal world. The simulation driver will receive serialized
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and encrypted simulation request payload from user space. The TEE library in user space
will transparently serialize, encrypt and decrypt data for the TA. Since the RPC is a
cross-world call, memory is required for data sent to normal world, and data expected
from normal world. The simulation driver will allocate shared memory for input and
output. In the OP-TEE kernel, a RPC can be invoked [135] by allocating input / output
parameters using thread rpc alloc payload(), preparing parameters of type
struct thread param and invoking the RPC using thread rpc cmd(). OP-TEE
uses pre-defined commands to inform tee-supplicant in the normal world about the
type of RPC request, for example OPTEE MSG RPC CMD LOAD TA for loading a TA. For
Truz-Sim, a new RPC command called OPTEE MSG RPC CMD SIM was added to
tee-supplicant RPC handling in process one request() [137] to interact
with the Raspberry Pi board using TCP.

5.5.3

Normal World App Testing

In order for the Truz-Sim design to be useful for testing TEE based ideas, the
Truz-Sim project must evaluate normal-world TEE integration for various device types.
As shown in Figure 5.9, in normal cases an Android app uses libraries provided by the
Android to interact with devices via normal-world device drivers (black arrows in figure).
It is important to maintain transparency for the Android app for testing secure cases, i.e.
the app should be able to use the same APIs with minor configuration change to indicate
use of TEE. To evaluate testing of secure cases, the existing Android library and Android
framework are modified s.t. the app can use the same APIs to leverage TEE. In such cases,
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Fig. 5.9.: Normal World App Leveraging TEE for Secure Cases

the TEE driver in the normal world is used so that a TA is invoked and data for
corresponding hardware is obtained via the TEE.

5.5.4

Camera Access Implementation

This section discusses how an Android app obtains a picture via the Android camera
API and how the Truz-Sim design is used to transparently provide the Android app a
picture via the TEE. An Android app can control the camera and get a picture using the
architecture [112] shown in Figure 5.10. The app will use the camera API via a library
provided by Android. The API allows the app to interact with a camera service in the
mediaserver process. For Truz-Sim design evaluation for the camera use case, the
camera library was modified such that the app can transparently use the existing camera
API and request a picture via the TEE (e.g. attested) for the secure case.
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Fig. 5.10.: Default Control Flow for Getting Picture from Camera

Camera API Versions 1 and 2. Android provides two versions of the camera API
(v1 [70, 110] and v2 [111]). v1 was deprecated in Android API 21. However when
evaluating Truz-Sim for various apps, it was observed that many of the apps tested still
used the v1 API. This may due to the fact that the v1 API is simpler and more
consistent [69]. To evaluate the camera test case, integration for both camera v1 and v2
APIs was done to test the Truz-Sim design. Four major steps are involved when an
Android app uses the Camera API: (1) the app accesses the camera to get a camera
instance, (2) the app creates a camera preview, which involves using a view in the app’s
Activity to display what is observed by the camera as this allows the user to position
the camera to take the picture, (3) capture is initiated to get a picture from the camera, (4)
the picture is displayed or saved to a file. The comparison of the steps for v1 and v2 APIs
is shown in table 5.1.

Camera Integration Changes. The Truz-Sim design needs to be tested for cases
where the Android app needs to get a camera picture (e.g. attested) from the TEE. To
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Table 5.1: Camera Access Steps in V1 and V2 APIs
Step
Access
Camera
Camera
Preview

V1 API
Using Camera API open()

Initiate
Capture

Using API takePicture() and
providing callback using PictureCallback’s onPictureTaken()
to obtain picture data

Display
Picture

Example: convert picture data to
Bitmap and display in a view

Using a class derived from
SurfaceView and using Camera
API startPreview()

V2 API
Using
CameraManager
API
openCamera()
Creating
a
CameraCaptureSession
and
using
the
API
setRepeatingRequest()
Creating a CaptureRequest,
with output Surface (e.g.
TextureView)
added
using
addTarget();
using
CameraCaptureSession
API
capture();
callback
onCaptureCompleted()
invoked once picture is taken
The camera device sends a frame
of the picture data into the output
Surface included in the request

maintain transparency, the Android app needs to use the existing API to take a picture.
Figure 5.11 shows the control flow for getting a picture via Truz-Sim. Before initiating
the capture, the app will need a camera preview for the user. During this step, the app will
get the pictures from the Pi board via the modified camera library (step À). Once the
camera has been positioned to take the picture, the user will click the button in the app.
This will send a request to the TEE via a bridge (native daemon), causing the invocation of
a TA (step Á). The TA will use simulation API to request a camera picture, which will
result in a request sent to the external Pi board via RPC (step Â). The picture is returned to
the TA, which returns it to the camera library. The library replies to the Android app via
the corresponding callback based on the camera API version.
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Fig. 5.11.: Truz-Sim Flow for Getting Picture from Camera

Camera Library Changes. Since the Android app will use the existing API for
transparency, the Truz-Sim integration needs to ensure that the behavior matches the
original case when getting the picture via the TEE. Figure 5.12 shows how the camera
library was modified to evaluate the Truz-Sim design. To ensure that the simulation
handling for camera behavior does not block the app’s UI thread, the handling is done on
separate threads via a new defined type CameraThread inside the camera library.
Using Truz-Sim, when an app uses the v1 API to open the camera, it will get a
Camera instance and can proceed to use API startPreview() for the camera
preview. When using the v2 API, the app invokes openCamera() to get a
CameraDevice, and gets a special derived type called SimulationCamera. The app
uses the CameraDevice reference to create a CameraCaptureSession, which
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Fig. 5.12.: Truz-Sim Camera Library Modifications

creates a special type called SimulationCameraSession. The app can use the API
setRepeatingRequest() to start the camera preview.
When an app wants to provide a camera preview (for both v1 and v2 APIs), the
CameraThread follows a loop involving getting a picture from the Pi board, creating a
Bitmap using the received data, and writing the bitmap to a Surface [107]. This
involves using a Canvas [17, 99], with the steps involving use of the Surface APIs
lockCanvas(), and unlockCanvasAndPost(), and the Canvas API
drawBitmap(). When the app wants to take a picture using the v1 API via
takePicture(), the CameraThread is used to get a picture from the TEE and
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converting the received data to a JPEG byte array to be returned via the callback
onPictureTaken(). When the app uses the v2 API capture(), the picture
retrieved from TEE is written to the output Surface.

TA API Usage for Camera. As mentioned in Section 5.5.1, in the Truz-Sim project
the event API behavior is demonstrated for the use case of camera. The test case involves
an Android app requesting one picture (e.g. attested) from the camera via the TEE. Unlike
a GPS sensor which is always streaming data, the camera picture will not be immediately
available at the time of request at the Pi board. The TA uses the simulation API and waits
for next complete camera picture event by using parameters for maximum number of
number of events as 1 and timeout as 5 seconds. Once the TA receives the camera picture,
it can further attest the picture. In the evaluation, to demonstrate that the path works, the
picture is simply returned to the camera library in the normal world, which returns it
transparently to the Android application.

Accessing Camera Picture on Raspberry Pi. The Python program on the Pi board
uses the PiCamera [37] library to access a camera image from a camera module [113].
The Truz-Sim evaluation focuses on taking the picture of a QR code, so the Python
code uses a resolution of 224 X 208 when requesting the picture. PiCamera provides a 3D
RGB array [3] via PiRGBArray. The python code returns the raw 3D array data to the TA
in the TEE.
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5.5.5

GPS Access Implementation

This section discusses how an Android app obtains GPS location via the Android
framework and how the Truz-Sim design is used to transparently provide the Android
app a GPS location via the TEE. An Android app gets GPS location from an Android
service called Location ManagerService. As shown in Listing 5.1, the app creates
a LocationListener with a callback called onLocationChanged(). The app
requests the location service for GPS location using the API
requestLocationUpdates() [129]. Once the location service has a GPS location
(from a provider like GNSS), it invokes the onLocationChanged() callback
providing a Location object, which can be used to obtain latitude and longitude
information. Figure 5.13 shows the control flow for an app obtaining location.
Listing 5.1: Android App Getting GPS Location
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity {
private LocationManager locationManager;
private LocationListener listener;

@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
locationManager = (LocationManager)
getSystemService(LOCATION_SERVICE);
listener = new LocationListener() {
@Override
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public void onLocationChanged(Location location) {
// location.getLatitude()
// location.getLongitude()
}
};
locationManager
.requestLocationUpdates("gps", 5000, 0, listener);
}

Fig. 5.13.: Default Control Flow for Getting GPS Location

Location Integration Changes. The Truz-Sim design needs to be tested for cases
where the Android app needs to get GPS location (e.g. attested) from the TEE. To
maintain transparency, the Android app needs to use the same API to get the location.
Figure 5.14 shows the control flow for getting the GPS location via Truz-Sim. The app
uses the API requestLocation Updates() to ask for GPS location from
LocationManagerService (LMS) (step À). The LMS forwards the request to the
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TEE via a bridge (native daemon), leading to the invocation of a TA (step Á). This is
blocking call done on a separate thread, so that LMS is not blocked. The TA will use the
simulation API to request GPS location, which will result in a request sent to the external
Pi board via RPC (step Â). The python code on the Pi board uses the pySerial
library [140] to will retrive the location from GPS hardware [121]. The location is
returned to the TA, which returns it to LMS. The location service replies to the Android
app via the callback onLocationChanged() to provide the GPS location (step Ã).

Fig. 5.14.: Truz-Sim Flow for Getting GPS Location

GPS NMEA Sentence. A GPS receiver module uses a protocol called NMEA, with each
block of data received referred to as a NMEA sentence or a just “sentence”. There are
different types of GPS sentences [4, 20]. When GPS hardware [121] is connected to the Pi
board, different types of GPS sentences are observed as shown in Figure 5.15. In the
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Truz-Sim project, the focus is on three sentences, namely GPGLL, GPRMC and GPGGA.
These sentences can provide latitude and longitude information. From the example of
GPGLL sentence shown in the Figure 5.15, 4302.29963 (N) and 07607.84018 (W) are
latitude and longitude respectively. During testing, values except latitude and longitude
were hard coded in the LMS as several apps need more information that just latitude and
longitude. Researchers can further expand the scope and analyze other sentences for more
information.

Fig. 5.15.: GPS Sentences Observed On Raspberry Pi

TA API Usage for GPS. As mentioned in Section 5.5.1, in the Truz-Sim project the
peripheral API behavior is demonstrated for the use case of the GPS sensor. The TA will
use the simulation API and specifies a maximum size for GPS sentence length. The
python code on the Pi board retrieves the next GPS sentence seen. The TA requests the
next GPS sentence (one at a time) until a GPGLL sentence is found. The TA gets the raw
GPGLL data from the Pi board, and returns GPGLL sentence to the LMS. The LMS parses
latitude and longitude from GPGLL and converts to decimal coordinates before returning
to the app. In Truz-Sim evaluation, the GPS sentence is simply returned to the normal
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world, but in a real test case, the TA can also return an attestation of the GPS location to
the normal world.

Record and Replay. Depending on the type of building the researcher is testing in,
there may be issues observed when using GPS indoors [122]. It will depend on the
building’s construction material and potential interference sources. The researcher can
choose to use a GPS signal amplifier. The researcher can also use a record and replay
approach, wherein the researcher records a raw GPS trace when outside the building and
save it to a file. When using the simulation setup, the researcher can use the saved file in
the Python program to provide the next GPS sentence upon request from the TEE.

5.5.6

UI Touch Input

As discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, Android apps can use EditText and
AlertDialog to get text input and action confirmation respectively. Text input is used
as a test case to evaluate whether Truz-Sim’s design can be used for UI touch input.
Chapter 3 discusses how seamless keyboard binding can be used to allow an Android app
to get secure text input via the TEE (shown in Figure 3.4). The interaction between the
normal-world input method framework and the TEE will be assumed to be the same as
Figure 3.4. Under the scope of Truz-Sim, the evaluation needs to establish that the TA
can use the simulation based approach to reliably get the text input. The final flow for a
researcher using Truz-Sim to test Truz-UI will look like Figure 5.16.
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Fig. 5.16.: Flow for Truz-UI Test Using Truz-Sim

Fig. 5.17.: Hardware Setup Overview for Truz-UI (From Chapter 3)

Hardware Setup. Section 3.9 presents a overview picture of the hardware setup for
testing the use case of secure text input (under Truz-UI). The picture is duplicated in
Figure 5.17 for reference. The same picture can apply when a researcher is testing based
on the Truz-Sim’s design. The difference with Section 3.9 is the use of the RPC channel
instead of the UART channel from the TEE. It was the intention of the disseration author to
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use the most recent AOSP + OP-TEE build available at the time to evaluate Truz-Sim
and UART was not an option.
When the TA is invoked by the normal-world method framework, it can use the RPC
channel (similar to UART) to inform the Pi board of the request, which is also lead the
Python code to change the switch setting for the mulitplexer and demultiplexer. The Pi
board will have control of display and touch input. Figure 5.16 shows a snapshot of this
state where normal-world is not controlling the display or touch input.
In previous sections (5.5.5 and 5.5.4) and corresponding evaluation sections (5.6.1 and
5.6.2), the use of switches was not discussed. A researcher can use a hardware setup
similar to Figure 5.17 for the use cases of camera and GPS to further extend the setup
shown in Figure 5.22. The researcher can use a USB based camera / GPS, and use a USB
switch (under Pi’s control) to decide which world can control the peripheral. When the
peripheral is in normal world’s control, its workability will depend on whether the AOSP
build at the time has necessary support for the USB peripheral.

TA API Usage for Touch Input. As mentioned in Section 5.5.1, in addition to camera,
the event API behavior is also demonstrated for the use case of UI (touch input). Unlike
the evaluation for camera, where only one event is read at a time (picture event), the UI
touch input evaluation covers reading multiple events at a time. Taking the example of a
TA needing password input from the user, the TA will use the simulation API to send a
RPC request to the Python code on the Pi board to request text input. During the test, the
TA specified maximum number of events as 5 and timeout as 3 seconds. The Python
program on the Pi board uses the Tkinter library [142] to draw the UI, similar to the one
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Fig. 5.18.: Event Queue Used By Python Program on Pi Board

shown in Figure 3.14 (right). The Python code will maintain an event queue and accept
user input. Each event will correspond to one character typed by the user. The Python
code uses the perf counter from the time package to keep track of the elapsed time
to decide when to return the result. The python code will respond with the character set
obtained within the timeout period. If the input has not been terminated, the TA will
request the next set of typed characters. Once the TA verifies the user input has been
terminated, the TA will use the provided characters as the password input.
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5.6

Evaluation

5.6.1

GPS Testing

The setup for doing GPS testing for Truz-Sim involved using a Hikey board with
AOSP (version 9) and OP-TEE (version 3.6.0) installed. Three APKs for Google
Play store, firebase and Google Play services were also installed as apps need their
support in order to run. The packages com.android.vending,
com.google.android.gms and com.google.android.gsf were obtained
from the website apk mirror [109]. The testing was done only on closed source apps
downloaded from the Google Play store. The hardware setup is similar to the picture
shown in Figure 5.22, except instead of a camera, a USB GPS dongle [121] is attached to
the Pi board. The HDMI display in the figure shows the normal world (Android) from the
Hikey board. The Pi board has a Wifi dongle that allows the Hikey to reach it via the
network. An example result of testing with a closed source app is shown in Figure 5.19
(results corresponds to the app “My GPS Location”) with latitude and longitude obtained
from the TEE. Table 5.2 shows the list of apps successfully tested for latitude and
longitude information using Truz-Sim.

Attestation Issue. In addition to using APIs for LMS to obtain location, Android apps
can also get location from GMS [118]. During testing it was observed that on the Hikey
build, GMS is using LMS to get the location (see Figure 5.20). For the ten apps tested, it
is observed that the location provided by simulation can be used by closed source apps
(three test apps used LMS and seven used GMS + LMS). LMS and GMS return a
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Fig. 5.19.: GPS Test Case
Table 5.2: List of Closed-Source GPS Apps Tested
App Name
My GPS Location
MapQuest
Latitude Longitude

Driving Route Finder

Foursquare City Guide
Accuweather
Lyft
EventBrite
Meetup
HotPads Apartments
& Home Rentals

Google Play Link
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.digrasoft.mygpslocation
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.mapquest.android.ace
https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=
com.mylocation.latitudelongitude
https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=
com.virtualmaze.drivingroutefinder
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.joelapenna.foursquared
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.accuweather.android
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=me.lyft.android
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.eventbrite.attendee
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.meetup
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.hotpads.mobile
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Fig. 5.20.: Paths Used to Obtain Location

Location object to the app. In the current Truz-Sim testing, LMS returns a Location
object for transparency, and TEE simply returns the location information to demonstrate
the entire flow works. In case a researcher uses simulation to get the location attestation
from the TEE, the LMS path will guarantee to provide the attestation to the app, as the
attestation can be attached to the Location object. The GMS path does not guarantee this,
as the GMS may alter the Location object, reconstruct it or may forward it as it received it.

Performance. To evaluate performance, the time taken to get GPS location using the
Truz-Sim setup was measured. The timing reported does not include time taken in the
app logic. Timing was measured starting when the app requests GPS data, and ending
when the GPS data is handed over to the app. The testing was done using the app
“MapQuest”. The test was repeated 20 times. Figure 5.21 shows the round trip times for
individual steps.
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Fig. 5.21.: GPS Simulation Access Performance Breakdown

The most amount of time is taken between the TA and the Python code on the Pi board.
The setup used a Pi 3B board with a USB Wifi adaptor and the Hikey using a USB ethernet
adaptor. Tests were also done using an ethernet cable attached to the Pi board (Hikey and
Pi connected via a switch) and the timing result was similar. The time between the TEE
and the Pi board is influenced by several factors. Different Raspberry Pi boards have
different networking performance [138]. The Hikey board used in the experiment supports
USB 2.0 [123]. More recent version of the board provides USB 3.0 support [124]. If the
researcher chooses to use a LAN setup, then the category of the ethernet cable used [117]
will affect the transmission speed. In future if SPI can work for the Raspberry Pi board in
slave mode, then different performance would be observed compared to using RPC.
The GPS receiver was used at an update rate [120] of 1 Hz and a baud rate of 115200.
The GPS receiver was connected via USB 2 which provides a bit rate of upto 480 Mbps
(the four USB ports on the Pi board are connected to a common bus operating at max rate
of 480 Mbps [139]). GPS receivers used in industry can provide 20 Hz update rate [16]
and are connected via [130] the I2C interface (with bit rate of upto 5 Mbps [176]) or I3C
interface (using bit rate of 10 to 11 Mbps [132]).
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5.6.2

Camera Testing

Similar to the discussion in the previous section, the setup for the testing of the camera
use case for Truz-Sim involved a Hikey board (AOSP and OP-TEE installed) with
necessary Google packages installed. The testing was done using the camera app in the
AOSP Hikey build and several closed source apps downloaded from the Google Play
store. The hardware setup is shown in Figure 5.22, where a camera module [113] is
attached to the Raspberry Pi board via the CSI interface. An example result of testing
with a closed source app (FastScanner) can be found in the demo video [114]. The test
shows the app getting a picture of a QR code via the TEE. In the video, the recording
camera is put down at time 0:30 for 4 seconds, in order to press the button in the app to
request camera capture. Table 5.3 shows the list of apps tested to get a camera picture
using Truz-Sim. In the table, only the AOSP Camera test is for an app using the v2 API;
the rest of the apps in the table used the v1 API.

Fig. 5.22.: Camera Test Setup
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Table 5.3: List of Camera Apps Tested
App Name
AOSP Camera
FastScanner

Cam Scanner
Clear Scan

Document Scanner
ScanBizCards Lite
Smart Doc Scanner
Jet Scanner Lite
Receipts by Wave

Google Play Link
Part of Hikey Build
https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=
com.coolmobilesolution.fastscannerfree
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.bcaapps.scanner
https://play.google.com/
store/apps/details?id=
com.indymobileapp.document.scanner
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.cv.docscanner
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.scanbizcards
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.mobilicy.docscanner
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.stoik.jetscanlite
https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=com.waveaccounting.receipts

There were several issues observed while testing camera apps from the Google play
store on the Hikey board. The issues corresponded to support not provided by Truz-Sim
and to various errors observed during runtime. Errors included multi-dex support and
ImageView / TextView inflation errors. Some apps didn’t work because they relied on
Google’s CameraX library [115] or the Mobile Vision API [49]. Other apps didn’t work
because they didn’t follow Google’s recommended steps for using the camera API. Some
apps applied additional rotation which sometimes results in mirror picture. This can be
solved by researchers by applying an additional orientation change (in the python code)
based on the test case the researcher is pursuing. In case of the camera app in AOSP’s
Hikey build, the app can take a picture without any issue, but when a second app requests
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the camera app for a picture using an Intent, the camera app doesn’t send the result
back via an Intent. This issue was not further investigated as it was presumed that the
issue would be fixed in the future as the build matures.

Fig. 5.23.: Camera Simulation Access Performance Breakdown

Performance. To evaluate performance, the time taken to get the camera picture using
the Truz-Sim setup was measured. The timing reported does not include time taken in
the app logic. Timing was measured starting when the app requests the camera to take
picture (after user presses the button), and ending when the picture data is handed over to
the app. The testing was done using the app “FastScanner”. The test was repeated 10
times. Figure 5.23 shows the round trip times for individual steps. The factors influencing
the timing between TEE and the Pi board are similar to the discussion in Section 5.6.1.
The delay in getting the picture from the camera on the Pi board will be influenced by
shutter delay and bandwidth of the CSI interface. Before a picture is taken, 100 ms are
used in Python code to wait for the camera to warm up. Cameras used with Raspberry Pi
use an image capture approach called rolling shutter [38, 177]. This is similar to mobile
phone digital cameras. The Raspberry Pi uses MIPI CSI-2 interface with bandwidth of
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upto 2 Gbps [36]. Cameras used in industry are also connected via CSI [130], with MIPI
CSI-3 interface supporting a bit rate of upto 14.88 Gbps [131].

5.6.3

UI Touch Input Testing

Testing UI touch input with Truz-Sim involves testing interaction between the
normal-world input method framework and the TA , and the path used by the TA when it
uses simulation to get user input. The first part has already been evaluated in chapter 3.
This section shows an example for the flow shown in Figure 5.18, involving the TA getting
user touch input from the Pi board. For this independent test, the TA was directly invoked
from command line in the normal-world, with the expected returned result to be the
password typed by the user.

Fig. 5.24.: TA Log When Accessing UI Touch Input

Figure 5.24 shows an example log for the TA using simulation to get user input. The
log corresponds to a TA using maximum number of events as 5 and a timeout of 3
seconds. The occurence of sim test() in the log corresponds to the system call added
in OP-TEE. The string ‘abcdpassword’ was typed slowly on the UI displayed by the
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Python code to check timeout behavior. In this test the password is simply returned to the
normal world. In a real test for Truz-UI, the researcher will use the reference concept
discussed in chapter 3, save the password in the TEE memory, and return a reference
corresponding to the password to the normal-world input method framework.

5.7

Discussion

Truz-Sim achieves the goal of reducing setup time and reducing hardware
experience required on behalf of the researcher in order to setup a hardware test
environment to do TEE research, given the rich community support available for
interfacing peripherals with the Raspberry Pi. For a typical research project where
researcher wants to use a peripheral (like sensors, camera etc.) in the design, using
Truz-Sim will suffice in order to evaluate the feasibility of the researcher’s design.
Given the current iteration of Truz-Sim is based on Hikey and Raspberry Pi, the
interface support the researcher will get via the Pi board matches that on Hikey’s low /
high speed header including I2C, SPI, CSI, USB, I2S. The researcher can use these
interfaces without vendor support in the TEE.
Truz-Sim has a limitation when it comes to latency. In the performance evaluation
for GPS and camera, there is a delay observed between the TA and the Pi board when
using the RPC channel. The time spent on RPC and in the Python code on the Pi board is
additional overhead, compared to a real phone case [130] where a direct CSI or I3C bus
would be used for communication between the application processor and the peripherals.
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The additional latency will impact researchers who want to test a system with real time
requirements.
Peripheral bit rate used in simulation depends on the interface support available.
Taking camera and GPS as example, the latest iteration of Raspberry Pi at the time of
writing provides CSI support for camera, but only provides I2C support and does not
provide I3C support for connecting GPS. GPS can also connected via USB. Existing
developer board hardware support will impact the interface researcher can use in the
simulation experiment. This will impact researchers who want to test a given peripheral
with the latest interface specification.
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6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In summary, this dissertation provides solutions transparent to applications to protect user
interaction channels on a mobile platform using ARM TrustZone. The dissertation
focuses on the user interaction channels of UI input and audio I/O. First, this dissertation
has proposed Truz-UI, a transparent design that allows normal-world apps to leverage
TrustZone via existing OS APIs to protect user interaction via UI input. The design
utilizes a cross-OS binding between the UI interaction in the secure world and the code in
the normal-world app, allowing the app developer to request a secure version of the UI
and provide the code to be bound to this UI. Second, this dissertation has proposed
Truz-Call, a transparent design to protect users audio I/O during a VoIP call by
integrating TEE at essential stages in a VoIP apps audio pipeline. The design allows VoIP
apps to leverage TrustZone while using existing OS APIs and VoIP protocol, and provides
generic TA support so that no app-specific TA code is needed. Lastly this dissertation
proposed Truz-Sim, a design for a simulation based TEE prototyping environment that
can allow researchers to interface different category of hardware with the TEE OS
irrespective of the available support from the vendor. The design utilizes a cross-OS
binding between the trusted application in the TEE and hardware attached to a different
OS on a different board like Raspberry Pi. All solutions have been implemented and
tested on the TrustZone-enabled Hikey development board.
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6.1

Secure Input Interaction for Hybrid Applications

A hybrid mobile application is developed using web technologies like HTML, CSS
and JavaScript, and then wrapped in a native application [27, 126]. This is facilitated by
an embedded browser component in the native application. In Android, this feature is
provided by the WebView component [147]. WebView allows an app developer to
display web content as part of the Activity layout. A recent survey [48] shows an
increase in preference on part of app developers to adopt hybrid app development. Given
the adoption of hybrid apps, there is a need to provide secure user input interaction for
cases involving WebView. Truz-UI can be further extended to cover hybrid apps.
Since Android 4.4 (KitKat), the WebView component has been based on the
Chromium open source project [148]. The Chromium architecture [153] involves two
major components, the browser kernel and the rendering engine. To access operating
system functionality such as user interaction, the rendering engine relies on the browser
kernel API. In case of text input, Chromium under its content module uses
ImeAdapterImpl [116] which uses Android framework’s InputMethodManager
to request display of a keyboard. This pattern matches the keyboard request covered in
chapter 3. This indicates that the proxy IME app can be used to request invocation of a
secure keyboard in the TEE. Further investigation would be required on how to allow
marking of UI elements inside the WebView as secure and how to setup the cross-OS
binding to allow a reference result from the TEE to be returned transparently to the web
application code inside the WebView.
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6.2

VoIP Computation Stages in TEE

As shown in Figure 4.5, one of the stages in a VoIP app is marked as computation. For
input audio, this includes computation like read resampling (downsampling), volume
adjustment, equalization and compression. For output audio, this can include
decompression, volume adjustment, equalization, and upsampling. Truz-Call disables
the additional computation stages as end-to-end latency increases with every stage that
uses TEE (due to invocation time), and the stages will also add to the TCB in the secure
world. The design also needs to ensure that no computation stage tampers with the
reference data in the normal world.
Instead of supporting these stages by integrating each stage with the TEE, an alternate
solution can be to move the additional computation stages entirely into the TEE. Simply
moving the computation stages in their existing form will increase the TCB. Therefore
there is a need for a lightweight audio computation pipeline in the TEE that can achieve
sufficient audio quality improvement. The design for this would need to address the
tradeoff of acceptable TCB in the TEE vs acceptable audio quality for the VoIP call.

6.3

Expanding Hardware Simulation Support

Truz-Sim has so far been tested for camera, GPS and UI touch input. There is
further expansion and testing that can be done to demonstrate support for broader variety
of peripherals. Referring a mobile system diagram [130], testing can be expanded to
include peripherals like fingerprint, baseband, sensors (including accelerometer,
gyroscope etc.) and NFC. This can facilitate further tests like fingerprint login where
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fingerprint data is only accessible by the secure world, and secure SMS with SMS text
only visible to the secure world. Testing can also be expanded to ensure simultaneous
peripheral access. Current testing involves only one type of peripheral at a time. Further
testing can be done to ensure simulation is stable enough to support cases where multiple
peripherals need to be accessed, e.g. in facial authentication [183] where camera and
accelerometer data is needed. Given that there is no existing work to use SPI in slave
mode on Raspberry Pi, further investigation can be done as that would provide an
alternative channel between the TEE and the Pi board.
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